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Foreword  
 
This Manifesto is the first systematic attempt of the Florence School of Regulation (FSR) to 
critically reflect upon the achievements of the 2
nd
 Barroso Commission in the various network 
industries. We also endeavour to establish a realistic outlook onto the challenges that await the 
Juncker Commission in the various network industries in terms of regulatory policy.  
This exercise builds on the experience of the Florence School of Regulation, which sees itself as 
a unique place where academic theory meets sectoral expertise, thanks to a practice-oriented 
research approach. As part of the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies at the European 
University Institute, the FSR has a long history of linking academic research with practical 
problems, leading to relevant regulatory policy dialogues and recommendations for the European 
Institutions.  
On the basis of FSR’s 10-year experience, four FSR Area Directors and Research Associates 
have been observing, analysing and making policy recommendations in the areas of energy, 
communications and media, transport and water regulation. The respective directors are 
Professor Jean-Michel Glachant, director of the FSR-Energy area and holder of the Loyola de 
Palacio Chair at the European University Institute; Professor Pier Luigi Parcu, director of the 
FSR-Communications and Media area and Director of the Centre for Media Pluralism and 
Freedom; Professor Matthias Finger, director of the FSR-Transport area and holder of the Swiss 
Post Chair in Management of Network Industries at Ecole Polytechnique Fédérale in Lausanne 
Switzerland; and Professor Stéphane Saussier, director of the FSR-Water area and Professor of 
Economics and Management at the Sorbonne Business School. 
The critical assessment done in this Manifesto aims to: first, give, in every chapter, a systematic, 
consistent and comprehensive look at the results obtained and the challenges ahead in the 
different sectors; second, reflect upon these sectoral goals in the wider perspective of the 
network industries; and third, encourage a European-wide debate so as to engage a wider 
competent audience in the reflection upon the European Union’s regulatory policies in the 
network industries for the upcoming legislative term.  
Dear reader: it is up to you to judge whether we have delivered on our promise. 
For the Florence School of Regulation: 
Matthias Finger 
Nadia Bert 
David Kupfer 
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Introduction  
 
At the State of the Union Conference (Florence, 7-8-9 May 2014) – the annual event organized 
by the European University Institute to reflect upon the European Union – José Manuel Durão 
Barroso defended his record as Commission President: in these times of change, he said, when 
the financial crisis evolved into an economic and social crisis, business as usual was no longer 
an option and some unprecedented measures had to be taken. He called on the new Commission 
to continue to serve the general European interest, as the European Union is more than a simple 
economic project. Rather, he recalled, the European Union is a profoundly political project, 
which has to be built on common policies implemented on a European scale.    
To recall, the Barroso Commission – especially the 2nd Barroso Commission (2010-2014) – had 
developed a long term plan to modernize Europe’s economies: the so-called “Europe 2020 
Strategy” (COM (2010) 2020) with its aim to create “smart, sustainable and inclusive growth” 
within the European Union. These three priorities were designed to be mutually reinforcing: 
smart growth to develop an economy based on knowledge and innovation; sustainable growth to 
promote a more resource efficient, greener and more competitive economy; and inclusive growth 
to foster a high-employment economy delivering social and territorial cohesion. 
Corresponding flagship initiatives reflecting these priorities were developed and implemented, 
also in the different sectors of the network industries, such as the Digital Agenda for Europe. At 
the end of the 2
nd
 Barroso Commission, a 2014-2020 EU budget was dedicated to research, 
innovation and infrastructures as instruments to connect the European Union within and beyond 
its own borders in the energy, transport and electronic communications sectors.  
The different network industries are the backbone of the European economy and, as such, they 
represent essential conditions for Europe’s prosperity and global competitiveness, something 
which was increasingly recognized during the 2
nd
 Barroso Commission. Their reform, by way of 
their de- and re-regulation over the past 20 years, was and still is considered to be central to 
achieving precisely this aim. However, energy, transport, communications and media and water, 
while following similar patterns of de- and re-regulation, are of course at different stages of the 
process and, as such, encounter different obstacles. More precisely, in the energy sector, the EU 
heads of State decided, in 2011, to create a single European energy market to be achieved by 
2015. Similarly, in the transport sector it was reiterated in the 2011 White Paper to work towards 
a Single European Transport Area, supported by a Trans-European Transport Network policy, 
financed by a Connecting Europe Facility (infrastructure investments). In the electronic 
communications and media sector, the Commission has been trying to push more reforms to 
finally create a digital single market. And in the water sector, after a long period of stagnation, 
since the 2000 Water Framework Directive, a broad Concessions Directive was finally adopted 
in 2014… in which water was excluded! 
While it is difficult to determine which of the network industries has been most successfully de- 
and re-regulated, it is possible to identify the main measures taken and achievements reached by 
the 2
nd
 Barroso Commission as well as the main challenges remaining for the Juncker 
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Commission. This is what we will do in the following four sections of this Manifesto, covering 
the Energy, the Communications and Media, the Transport and the Water sectors. 
Let us mention that the Juncker Commission has already started with some very interesting 
actions concerning the different network industries. Indeed, significant funds for European 
infrastructure development (Investment Plan for Europe) have been allocated, mobilizing an 
additional 315 billion € for infrastructure investments. Also very promising is the proposed 
cross-institutional approach addressing some of the most important cross-sectorial challenges 
(e.g., Vice Presidencies for climate action and energy, as well as for the digital single market). 
One must also mention the Juncker Commission’s special attention paid to the issue of fighting 
red tape and reducing over-regulation with the creation of a corresponding Commissioner, the 
Vice Presidency for better regulation.  
Yet, many challenges remain in all the European infrastructure sectors. The most dramatic ones 
are probably in the energy sector, where Europe is facing profound choices when pursuing, or 
not, the single European energy market in light of nationalistic tendencies fuelled by concerns 
over (national) security of supply and national industrial policies. The challenges in the 
electronic communications and media sector are no less daunting, considering the tremendous 
impact of the Internet, which has revolutionised market dynamics and business models. And in 
the transport sector, the creation of a single European transport area clearly faces the challenge of 
inter-modality, which is ultimately the challenge of creating a level playing field between the 
different transport modes for the mobility market to properly function. But the true challenge for 
the Commission will be to make use of de- and re-regulation in the different network industries 
in the interest of the European citizens and users in terms of accessibility to, affordability and 
quality of the all these fundamental infrastructure services. 
 
Matthias Finger 
Jean-Michel Glachant 
Pier Luigi Parcu 
Stéphane Saussier  
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Chapter 1: Energy 
 
Jean-Michel Glachant*  
* Director of the Energy Area of the Florence School of Regulation, Jean-
Michel.Glachant@EUI.eu  
 
 
No EU policy can be perfect - it will inevitably be a compromise between a good cause and a 
due cause. However, we are now at a critical turning point, as several pillars of former Barroso’s 
EU energy policy have already collapsed, prompting an update or an entire overhaul. 
The collapse of key energy policy pillars of Barroso’s decade: 
1. The world has cheaper and more abundant fossil fuels than expected. 
2. The EU internal Market conceived for gas-fuelled plants competition (CCGTs) has to 
deal with a fierce RES subsidised push. 
3. The EU Green Revolution (to push us as world R&D and leading manufacturer of a 
decade-long green growth) is gone. 
4. Carbon pricing originated in the EU and was adopted to some degree here and there but 
ceased to offer any incentive to change the EU vis-à-vis GHG emissions. 
The EU Supply Security is lower than at the fall of the Soviet Union, or before the Bush-Blair 
invasion in Iraq; and the EU has to address it by itself. 
Then what are the key components that can put EU energy policy back on track toward reaching 
our 2020-2030 goals? The following policy brief offers a new vision of the energy policy for our 
new Commission from an independent, academic point of view. 
For me, there are five key questions for the renewal of our EU energy policy: 
1. The Internal Electricity Market: A European crisis with any European remedy? 
2. The Internal Gas Market: A last mile needed for achievement, but a mile too far? 
3. 28 national ways from 20-20-20 to 2030: Could it lead the EU somewhere? 
4. Energy Policy Governance: Is there any appropriate new framework for a new EU 
energy policy? 
5. External Energy Security and Policy: At least some Energy Union – or only Energy 
disunion? 
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1. The Internal Electricity Market: a European crisis with any European 
remedy? 
Our internal electricity market is in a crisis because global demand is low due to the EU 
economic and financial crisis, and because “residual demand” for non- renewable generation is 
further depressed by the RES push. 
The resulting wholesale power price stays very low, at an unsustainable level, impeding any 
market- based investment. 
To recover from this crisis at the wholesale level, we see two alternative options: a “mini”, and a 
“maxi”. 
Mini option for Wholesale: “very few market fixes” and “decommissioning redundant gas 
plants” 
We might then look at just a few improvements within the existing EU market design: as the 
opening of a “really reflexive market for flexibility” on the short term horizon, (with a view to 
achieving a “real time” and ”balancing” reshuffle). 
This limited intervention would co-exist alongside the closure (from x% to 100%) of currently 
redundant plants – notably the CCGTs. 
Maxi option for Wholesale: does a “long term market based equilibrium” exist for power 
system investment and operation? 
We could embark upon a “New Power Market Deal”, along the lines that today might be termed 
the “2025 horizon”: a new market design that the EU should target, to achieve a sustainable 
2020-2030 power market, capable of efficiently integrating massive renewables (both at 
investment and operational stage), and delivering a thorough decarbonisation system, on a 
market basis. 
The “DG Competition – Eurelectric” idea that the average costs of investing and operating the 
renewables will, in the future, eventually meet the average wholesale energy market price (incl. 
carbon price), is only an assumption; the veracity of which no academic has yet succeeded in 
demonstrating. 
Notably, the problem mostly comes from the “competitive hydraulics” of continuously injecting 
more energy with “near to zero marginal costs”, in a market relying on its marginal costs to price 
the delivered energy. 
If we do not believe in a “zero marginal cost miracle”, we would have to look at creating a new 
market structure, attracting entrepreneurs to “power investment and operation” via long term 
competitive supply contracts. 
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RES and the other technologies will have to compete to win an ex-ante guarantee of demand and 
minimum revenue, with consistently priced carbon (either from a carbon market or a carbon 
“price guarantee”). 
Of course, this long term reshuffle could be based on, or combined with, the “reliability option” 
in short term markets, as seen before. 
To make the framework of such long term contracting truly credible for new investors, the grid 
system operators might have to offer guaranteed access to the grids (or, a financial guarantee of 
the grid access costs), in a “Financial Transmission Rights”-like market. 
At the retail level we also see two options, being a “mini”, and a “maxi” 
Mini option for Retail: “No Regret” for a retail innovation wave based on an EU minimal 
level playing field 
No “smart retail” revolution is easily predictable. However why can’t the energy domain for 
households be next? Even if this revolution was too slow to become “today’s mass market game 
changer”, why should the existing millions of “prosumer households” (already conquered by PV 
self-generation) not be seen as big enough to start building a new retail universe as active and 
interactive as the power wholesale universe? 
A rational, and yet prudent, EU policy should therefore look at creating a certain “minimal retail 
level playing field”, avoiding too much EU fragmentation into local proprietary sub-systems. 
We might consider EU compatible standards of operation; a forward- looking cyber- security 
policy (with police mirroring our EU Air Traffic Control). 
And, of course, we need minimum EU unbundling requirements, to give sufficiently open access 
to data, to devices, to alternative processes, offers and decision- making powers. 
Maxi option for Retail: a “Golden Bridge” to a European retail innovation wave 
Instead of being mainly passive and overlooking brave, private initiatives with a minimal 
interference of existing retail barriers, the EU could embark on a comprehensive retail overhaul, 
of the same scale and ambition as the wholesale power market uptake in the second and third EU 
energy Packages. 
There is a real rationale for such an ambitious approach. The current EU market and regulatory 
frameworks have been mainly conceived for: 
1. Opening a wholesale market to the power plants which are connected to the transmission 
grids. 
2. Accessing multiple countries’ markets through cross-border rules embedded in ENTSOs 
network codes. 
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As a due consequence of this “wholesale + transmission” design priority, all of the “micro 
institutions” needed for reflexive retail (prosumers, demand response, “smart homes”, and their 
interactivity with distributions grids) have not been placed at the core of the EU system, or even 
taken into account. 
The EU may establish a full and comprehensive EU “smart retail and distribution grids 
package”. 
This “package” could address the full EU harmonisation of standards of operation for 
distribution grids, ITC networks and retail markets: 
1. A harmonisation of retail services, pricing processes and formulas. 
2. An integration of retail and wholesale market designs, of transmission and distribution 
grid codes. 
3. A seamless functioning of all countries’ retail markets as a single EU retail market; a 
coherent grid- planning horizon. 
4. A cooperative investment methodology dialogue between ENTSO.E, and a kind of 
ENDSO.E yet to be established. 
Without a doubt, this agenda is very ambitious, but not much more than our third energy package 
already approved in 2009, after being deemed both unnecessary and unfeasible in 2004- 2005. 
2. The Internal Gas Market: a last mile needed for achievement, but a mile 
too far? 
The EU internal gas market is confronted with price and volume shocks coming from opposite 
directions. 
1. The US shale gas price, which is two to three times inferior to our internal wholesale 
market price, while the Russian-Ukrainian conflict threatening the gas transit from East to 
West. 
2. Do easy or relatively effective remedies exist that can mitigate these tensions? Or are 
there none? 
Once again, we are left with two options: one mini (“a last mile?”) and one maxi (“ten thousand 
miles more?”) 
Mini option for gas: the EU internal market is good, but cannot reverse the international gas 
price or freeze the Russian-Ukrainian conflict 
The fact that the EU is facing a gas price shock coming from the West, and a volume shortage 
threat coming from the East, does not necessarily imply an easy implementation of efficient 
measures to address both concerns. 
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If the EU cannot control its gas supply price (by any possible unilateral action), the only 
achievable and robust guarantee, to minimise the average gas price risk, is to allow any gas that 
is “a bit cheaper” or “from a new origin” to easily enter the market and be distributed 
everywhere welcome within the EU, even if only for a short term gain, or as an option against a 
worse future. 
Hence, our main task is to achieve and refine our EU internal gas market. Thanks to the gas 
demand crisis, the wholesale prices have already significantly converged in most of the EU 
(from the UK and the Netherlands to Germany and Austria, via France and Italy). 
We only need to consolidate our fuzzy, underlying EU gas target model to make sure that 
alternative gas flows will always be able to cross any border, at any time, when any gas arbitrage 
opportunity arises. To make this a reality, is only a “last mile” concern with only a few “grid 
access”, “capacity allocation”, “balancing regimes” or sometimes “market coupling” 
dimensions. 
It doesn’t say that all EU stakeholders will always applaud this “last mile” ride. 
Maxi option for gas: ten thousand miles more to secure our gas supply? 
The former “mini option gas” is flawed if it is illusory to believe that free wholesale market 
pricing will simply lessen a “big Eastern gas volume shock”. Markets cannot always easily deal 
with exceptional ruptures, which have yet to be incorporated in any workable action plan. Panic 
and irrational behaviour are then more likely to prevail. The EU internal market is to be 
complemented by a public intervention plan. 
If we want to prepare for a gas “volume earthquake”, it will necessarily imply public actions and 
public interventions. But these have to be discussed and made compatible, one with the other, as 
with the foundations of our EU gas system before the convulsion of the earthquake. 
We need to obviate the risk that incompatible local or national public plans, at different levels 
and in different zones, would rapidly make the global situation far worse, or entirely 
unmanageable. 
A measure of security is already provided for under the existing EU gas security regulation. We 
do hope that this has already been – or is on the verge of being – implemented via cooperation 
among the relevant public decision makers. 
In addition to the already existing “EU security and solidarity” framework, it would be useful to 
create a common European monitoring system delivering a consistent follow- up of our actual 
global gas storage level and its variations, at some aggregate level (both EU and regional). This 
might be coupled with some “storage security weakness indices”, which may help to signal a 
transparent and predictable regulatory “warning guidance” to market players at times of tension 
or pre-emergency (for example, when storage levels measure “too” low in mid-August. 
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Looking now at transformations geared toward the long term, we might also think about a new 
gas pipe investment regime where several TSOs could unite to build a few security enhancing 
“Gas International Entry Pipes” or commercially non-viable “Default LNG Terminals”. 
This maxi option inevitably opens many new doors to public intervention (as emergency plans, 
monitoring tools, weakness signalling, or joint investment in security infrastructures), that will 
partly change the way our internal gas market is run. But, this should not compromise or 
jeopardise what is already working well or, at least, not so badly, in the EU market. In that sense, 
our maxi option is not maximalist, but rather minimalist, while still being “at the margins of the 
existing” policy. 
Our EU internal gas market is an excellent tool. We may try to supplement it, only where and 
when socially plausible, and necessary. Security and solidarity are not enemies of the internal 
market if we prepare our emergency and solidarity plans as appropriately and orderly as we can. 
3. 28 national ways from 20-20-20 to 2030: could it lead the EU 
somewhere? 
The incoming Commission will start by following the path opened by “Barroso II” last autumn: 
28 national ways to EU 2030. 
The Council has already sent a warning, before the summer, not to jump from the existing “20-
20-20” policy to a “30-30-30”-like step. And on 23-24 October 2014, the Council reached a 
minimal energy targets deal with roughly half of the Member States, from which the EU will 
have to build a common “Paris 2015 International Conference” strategy. 
In this unchartered territory, uncertainty abounds. But, does it matter so much vis-à-vis the rest 
of the world? 
Any retreat from our “glorious 20-20-20 revolution” of Berlin 2007 would, of course, be easier 
or safer, vis-à-vis the “EU 2050 community”, if we were guaranteed an honourable and reliable 
position, until 2050, not only from our perspective as Europeans, but also from a reasonable 
global viewpoint. 
Hence, we are fortunate that such a legitimate “2050 policy programme safeguard” is provided 
by the recent report from Nicolas Stern and Felipe Calderon, issued before the UN Climate 
Summit in New York (“Better Growth, Better Climate: The New Climate Economy Report”, 
2014). 
Once again, as we head toward 2030, we are confronted with two paths, a consistent “mini” 
option (“Disarmament”) and a strong “maxi” option (“Two to tango”). 
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Mini option for 2030: disarmament in an EU aligned with globally recommended practice? 
Assume that we keep both our carbon market and our internal “dual fuel” (gas/power) market 
working within a 2030 Greenhouse Gas (GHG) binding constraint. What else are Stern and 
Calderon suggesting as reasonable tools to contribute to a robust world trajectory, towards an 
ultimate 2050 goal? 
Stern and Calderon suggest the following: 
1. They propose the phasing out of fossil fuel subsidies (about 25 billion euro in the EU, in 
2012). It is surprising that this has not yet been seriously discussed by our brave EU. May 
we also assume that it would cover the many cases where the full price of the non-
renewable energy mix consumed is not actually paid by the consumers, because of a 
regulated energy tariff deficit? 
2. They suggest phasing out the usage of coal. It is remarkable, that our European “Energy 
Transition leader” (Germany) has not yet started this process, while continuing to 
generate half of its power with coal. Certainly “phasing out coal” faster would imply 
consuming more gas, as a “bridge” (remember that the former German bridge to 
decarbonisation, before Fukushima, was nuclear). But, if decarbonising is our ultimate 
target, decarbonising is also the best way to go... Gas cannot be undermined once the 
process of discontinuing the use of coal begins to take effect, which may be as soon as 
tomorrow, or not far beyond that (perhaps by late 2015; after the Paris conference). Gas 
is, of course, expensive in the EU – decarbonisation comes at a cost. But, it would not be 
too great a shock, if the EU carbon price operated as a reward for decarbonisation, and 
not simply as just a number. 
3. They propose the creation of financial instruments, which favour investments in low 
carbon projects. This might also call for European public authorities to ensure all kinds 
of low carbon efforts are rewarded, not simply wind and PV projects. It should include 
any kind of energy efficiency projects recycling economies or demand side management; 
and even innovative and interactive EU apps to “smarten” our behaviour and devices. 
Equity, loans, awards, guarantees or any “smart” form of renewed “Public Private 
Partnerships” contracting should be pulled or pushed into competition with the present 
monopoly of RES feed-in financing. Of course, the bulk of the money collected through 
the auctioning of allowances could be re-injected there. 
4. They recommend the tripling of research and development expenses in low carbon 
technologies. Some of the potential financing channels have just been suggested; as 
equity, loans, awards, guarantees; any smart form of renewed “Public Private 
Partnerships” contracting and “allowances auctioning” mobilisation. 
Maxi option for 2030: two to tango- Target or not; all of the EU Member States cannot ignore 
Energy Efficiency 
What greater changes could be feasibly applied today or tomorrow by the 13 to 15 Member 
States that were more progressive at the 23-24th October Council? 
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Commissioner Oettinger, the German government and Juncker have already suggested “a 
binding EU efficiency target”. And Germany is preparing its “Efficiency National Action Plan” 
(from financing investments to pushing electrical cars). 
Yes, it might make sense for many different reasons (along with many others as yet unknown). 
A coalition of the willing Member States to beef up EU Energy Efficiency? 
1. Voluntarily blinding national efficiency target could be a balm for the wounds of the RES 
fans (the RES-pushing orphans). Today in the EU, reducing the consumption of energy 
has the same appeal as reducing carbon, more security of supply, more investments, more 
“white” jobs and more technology innovation as “green” RES had seven years ago. It is 
certain, that the UK example of a two decade “housing demand boom”, also brings an 
irresistible flavour to any public policy promoting growth and employment, 
complementing energy consumers’ choice. 
2. It could open a consistent framework to work together, at EU level, toward more 
demanding norms of product energy performance or the recycling of used products. We 
might proceed to mobilise our designers, engineers, manufacturers, etc. in the building of 
a new set of “advanced” products and by-products. We might even reopen the question of 
the actual energy and recycling performances of our car industry (and other durable 
goods). 
3. This could also help create a growing business of intermediaries managing the sub- 
contracting of energy efficiency and recycling performance delivery, with professionals 
investing and participating in the conception, installation, operation and maintenance of 
more energy, and recycling efficient sub-systems for buildings, malls, housing, plants, 
universities, hospitals, military camps, etc. 
4. That said, there is a taste for a “white” second wave of our first “green revolution”, that 
could also be worrying. Notably, who would finance the large deployment of energy and 
recycling efficiency? The consumers? By paying more, when buying the products or the 
new homes, or refurbishing the existing ones? Would the public authorities be the only 
ones accountable? If the voluntarily binding national targets are not too high, the public 
sector can itself commit to reaching them. But how would it finance this? With more 
taxes and duties, or with a greater public debt? Instead, or in addition, do we expect the 
private intermediaries and many new “public-private partnerships” to solely undertake the 
deployment of this “white” efficiency boom? Might a massive wave of EU borrowing - 
led by the European investment bank - be one of the solutions? This is more or less 
suggested, by Juncker, with his proposal to boost EU growth through an investment 
pyramidal scheme of €300 billion. If financing is in sight, we shall also have to avoid 
poorly conceived “long term efficiency contracts” locking the products and energy users 
into distorted arrangements, which are too favourable to the service providers (as seen in 
many RES feed-in over-shooting). Any “maxi” way to 2030, via voluntary binding 
national efficiency targets, would need a substantial clarification of its likely business 
models. 
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4. Energy Policy Governance: is there any appropriate new framework for 
a new EU energy policy? 
As predicted since November 2013, the major novelty of the EU energy policy is the absence of 
binding targets for each Member State, for both RES and Energy Efficiency (EE). We should 
therefore expect a wide variety of the policy directions and tools (including shale gas drilling) of 
the EU countries. And, the entire set of possible interactions between the only binding common 
tool at EU level (carbon pricing mechanism) and the various countries’ trajectories (for RES and 
EE) is, a priori, very large. 
It should not matter too much, if we were to assume that only our common markets (one for 
carbon and two others for the “dual fuels”) would act as key interaction platforms among 
Member States. The existing Commission’s “market weaponry” made of (“Internal Energy 
Market”) + (“Competition Policy, hence State Aid”) + (“Centralised Carbon Market”) can, of 
course, act as a credible governance structure for a European market-based path to 2030: hence 
the visible alliance of DG Comp-Eurelectric at the end of the year 2013. 
However it should matter, if we were willing the EU to reach some particular “focal points”, 
chosen as safe milestones on a preferred EU 2030-2050 trajectory. The existing Commission’s 
“market based arsenal” cannot promise to reach any pre-defined EU entry gate to the last 
bridge, 2030-2050. 
We then proceed to once again investigate two options that can do sensibly better: a mini and a 
maxi. 
Mini option for Governance: basically a market-based policy framework completed by the 
same EU governance set coming from the 3d Package, but more comprehensive and more 
responsive? 
Since 1990, the EU has been impressive in its continual effort to work at implementing the 
Single Act, in the gas and the power sector. 
Perhaps all that is required is to position mature renewable energy sources within a common EU 
upgraded market framework [opening a relatively coherent, equitable EU platform for RES 
investment and operation, including reliability options; harmonising “enough” capacity 
mechanisms, long term contracting of carbon pricing options, and of security of demand; etc.], 
and paving the way to demand response and retail activation of the prosumers.  
We should then be able to do it on the same institutional grounds as what the EU has done for 
energy since 1996 (= Internal Market + State Aid). 
At the top of its market-based framework, the EU may need some particular add-ons to better 
deal with the task of together reconciling the differences of 28 “independent” climate responsive 
countries. Add-ons could be: 
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1. The coupling of DG Energy and DG Climate in the Juncker Commission, if real 
cooperation between the two were to develop (which is certainly not guaranteed…). 
2. The Directorate “Energy Policy” (within the Energy area) could become the key expert, 
or a preeminent “opinion leader” influencing the migration. It is already opening its own 
“2030-2050 Forum” to keep a forward-looking/ progressive EU debate open, in addition 
to Florence, Madrid, London Fora, already dealing with a host of alternative views and 
proposals for the existing internal market. 
3. Both the ENTSOs, and ACER-CEER may open a responsive and structured analysis, at 
an EU and regional level, to decipher in rolling five-year “2025 forward- looking” 
assessment plans (for example, expanding their already existing regional TYNDPs), 
where the current market and network interactions (including the planned and likely 
investments) might lead us. 
4. Cooperation between TSOs for electricity might be made “institutional”, and take the 
form of “de-facto” Regional Transmission Operators-E (both for operation and planning) 
or of ISOs with a split between Transmission owning and Operation of the system. 
5. Power Market Operators might be gently pushed or pulled into one or another kind of 
“European Network of Market Operators-E”. 
6. The national authorities (the Member States governments too) should be pulled to 
strongly participate with proposals and best practices (as ½ of MS are actually “2030 
demanding”), and be strongly integrated in the new 2030- 2050 EU Forum. 
7. Last, but not least, it is key to open real “regional fields” for testing and experimenting 
(remember how the Market Coupling success between the “Pentalateral countries” paved 
the way to the EU power target model). Is it possible to build a few clubs of a few 
“pioneering MS” willing to play a leading role in better European integration for a better 
common energy policy? Can parts of the EU not participate in the Nordic game (where 
the deepening of regional integration is always fuelled from within, by one of the 
countries involved in this voluntary League)? Can we incorporate more consciously and 
more openly certain national and regional initiatives into the dynamics of a European- 
oriented 2030-2050 debate? Should we get more from the North-Sea or the Continental-
Visegrad initiatives? 
Maxi option for Governance: let’s be brave. Only an Energy Union could make it 
The weakest point of the above ‘mini option’ is to pretend to reach for a demanding energy 
target, on a preferred trajectory to 2050, while using only the traditional EU arsenal for market 
harmonisation and integration. 
Not many, but some in the Europeanised elite also think that countries’ 
NRAs (with their ACER) and countries’ TSOs (with their ENTSOs) are not homogeneous 
enough and bold enough to make the necessary leap. This is why - if the EU really wants to deal 
with demanding energy trajectories - the EU might have to build a “consistent enough” and 
“persistent enough” energy governance. 
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Its framework should not be any more of a gamble, “each semester”, to find out if the Council 
(or the Florence & the Madrid, the London & the Berlin Fora) will back the governance needs of 
the 28 chariot convoy until 2030. 
Maxi option for governance: a market-based governance + Third Package institutions won’t 
make it – only an “Energy Union” could. Hence, we actually need an “Energy Union” to make 
our 2030 to 2050 journey perfectly work - a common institution having the legitimacy and 
powers to deal with the continuous ‘Europeanisation’ of a demanding EU energy policy 
trajectory. This is reasonably obvious. But, what is not so obvious is how to get there. 
We may see, both behind us and ahead of us, that the severity of the EU financial crisis didn’t 
give our Central Bank a free hand in the management of the crisis. The Council - and the inter-
governmental deals - continuously intervened or vetoed; co-intervened or co-vetoed. 
To go to an Energy Union as a common institution for our energy policy, we will need the 
Council to open the fray and disarm for the common good of EU energy. How do you get to that? 
It seems that a greater Europeanisation of our energy mix, and of our many alternative 
sustainable energy trajectories, is not as appealing today, across Member States. 
It is exactly what the Council was unable to swallow last year in 2013, as this year 2013, in the 
redefinition of the EU 2030 strategy. 
Nevertheless, could any “Energy Union” rescue us? Even if not by magic, it could be the balm to 
our wounds: 
1. A “common house” to put all of our existing renewable sources together, in an open 
internal energy market, revamped for massive renewables. 
2. A planning office and an investment fund to upgrade our energy storages, grids and IT 
infrastructures, to strengthen our common energy reliability, our common renewables 
market, and our coming “Internet of Things”, which will inevitably revolutionise the way 
households manage their homes, their domestic devices, their heating and their energy 
bills. 
3. There may also be a framework for better common gas and power security, and more 
generally, a common energy security policy overseas.  
Might today’s “EU energy security” emergency work better at institutionalising an EU common 
energy house?  
Indeed, something might be coming from this front, because most of the EU feels the threat of a 
foreign heating emergency. But, we do not see how this heating security threat could open an 
institutional path to 2030-2050, except through a “Binding Efficiency Target”, which has already 
been refused by the Council, as a promised reduction of dependency on imports. 
So to sum up this “maxi” 2030 governance issue: Yes, an “Energy Union” could provide a more 
favourable trajectory toward 2030-2050; even if, prior to 2030, our common “day to day” policy 
mainly relied on market interactions. 
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However, up until 2030, the “Energy Dis-Union” seems more likely, than the Union. And the 
dilemma of “28 drivers on a single path” could keep running for the entire duration of Juncker 
Commission. 
5. External Energy Security and Policy: at least some Energy Union – or 
only energy disunion? 
The presumably weak state of our common 2030 trajectory will not necessarily spoil the 
outcome of the EU external energy security policy. 
The key question here is slightly different: are these security issues increasing mainly, or solely, 
at the MS level or, are they also mounting at an EU level? 
As it seems to be both yes and no, we are faced with a ‘mini’, as well as a ‘mini+’ and a ‘maxi’ 
option. 
Mini option for External energy affairs - keep our nerves and make only a few amendments to 
the internal market 
The EU energy policy has not yet been conceived, and does not have to deal with a fully-fledged 
energy security vis-à-vis international blockades, rogue states or terrorists threats. 
It would be a strategic policy mistake to expect from our internal market, our energy industry, 
our energy assets investment and operation, as well as from our energy regulation and policy, 
something which can only come from some really bold “state action”. By nature, in this mini 
option, the big external shocks are primarily managed at governmental or inter-governmental 
level, and belong to Member States’ heads and machinery. 
Of course, it could involve the Commission as the inter-governmental agent of the EU states; as 
well as others, like NATO etc. 
In a mini option, our two greatest friends for our energy security are our two, intertwined “dual 
fuel” markets for power and gas. 
It is because large continental energy markets reduce the operational size of the shocks that we 
receive, while enlarging the basins of “alternative available resources” responding to these 
shocks. Being bigger and still responsive enough, we are simply more resilient to shocks. 
Of course, we also can do a bit better within our existing internal market framework - as we have 
already seen above, for gas:  
1. It could be TSOs teaming up for building a few new “international” gas interconnections 
as gas pipes or LNG terminals. 
2. It might cover a set of common monitoring tools, alarm indices, and regulatory triggers. 
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3. It could also be the creation of a more consistent EU framework for power security, with 
a new regulation inspired by the already existing gas regulation (with clearly pre-defined 
roles for market, planning, regulation and solidarity). 
All of these are amendments which touch upon the EU market universe, but do not diminish it. 
These alterations aim to improve it, while not undermining the good EU market world, which 
already works. 
Mini option+ for external energy affairs 
EU Markets won’t make it by themselves, because of the scale of external problems, arising from 
our borders and affecting our internal markets. 
The mini+ option does not contest that our internal energy market(s) work(s). It only points out 
that things do not work so well at the EU borders of our internal market. 
The ‘Europeanisation’ of the borders of our internal market is not only unfinished; it is just 
beginning. Hence the saga of the Gas South Stream (and, before that, the North Stream) where 
many EU MS play their own national game with external energy providers, regardless of any 
cohesion or consistence with our common energy policy. 
It is as if energy wasn’t to be traded in the EU, within a common trade and investment regime, a 
common long term supply contracting order, and a common infrastructure and interconnection 
access framework 
To be really and fully achieved, our internal market has to be realised not only “inside” the EU, 
but also at all of its borders. Hence, a lot of work has still to be done. This question could be 
addressed in different orders, and at a different pace and depth. 
We nevertheless know that we have a lot of questions in this regard: 
1. Foreign trade and investment regime 
2. Supply contract framework 
3. Infrastructure access and unbundling 
4. Network and interconnections reliability and adequacy 
5. Value added to our “security of supply” at EU level 
6. Value added to our “energy sustainability” at EU level, etc 
7. This questioning can go as far as “buying energy together abroad”, as Commissioner 
Oettinger liked to say, and Polish leaders liked to repeat.  
8. It can also simply start by clarifying what is our common house for trade rules and an 
investment regime, supply contracting, interconnection access, and infrastructure 
unbundling. If we were to advance further (which means, beyond the internal side of our 
internal market borders, as with Oettinger and the new Polish head of the Council, Tusk) 
the big issue we might have to confront is to start integrating our own “internal market” 
with our existing external “Energy Community”. A Community which, in principle, 
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already extend our internal EU market... Could we think about reinforced integration 
tools as common grid codes? Extended TYNDPs? An articulated infrastructure package 
with PCIs and “connecting facility”? Amplified by a pro-active European Investment 
Bank? To end with co-ordinated security of supply regulations, solidarity and emergency 
action plans? 
9. Another foreign area, awaiting hard road repairs, is our neighbourhood policy (let’s say 
from Morocco to Turkey). Two points are already in mind here: 
a. The need to assess the actual infrastructure regime(s) that EU MS practise, with 
the countries belonging to our “Neighbourhood Belt”; 
b. In the same vein to assess the actual “status quo” or the ramping implementations 
of article 9 of the 2009 Renewable Energy Directive (by any of our EU MS, with 
any of our neighbouring countries). 
At the very least, we need to know the actual MS’s practice in relation to neighbouring countries, 
following a succession of grand proposals (such as the “Union for the Mediterranean”) and 
ambitious reports. 
Maxi option for external energy affairs: an Energy Security Union for European Energy 
Foreign Affairs? 
Refining or strengthening our internal market(s), at our borders, or a bit beyond them, will not 
critically improve our resistance to hard external energy pressures, and shocks... in today’s state 
of the world, with unprecedented disruptions and threats from our continental East – and 
neighbouring Middle- East - to our Southern shores. 
Markets cannot tackle such threats. It is simply not their job. Only an Energy Union can deliver 
external energy security to the European Union. Will it ever come? 
To significantly improve our EU energy security, in the present “state of the world”, is a “state 
affair”. We might expect our MS to react together, but we cannot be sure of this, and we cannot 
predict what kind of “inter-governmental” deal may follow, or what possible role there may be 
for the Commission. We also know that NATO already exists, and that, just after it was expected 
to somehow retire (at the end of 2013), it was resurrected (during the summer of 2014). But, 
what can it achieve? And, how will it determine EU energy security, infrastructure security or 
cyber security? These are all questions that need further investigation. 
The only thing that we really know, is that having an EU with its own “Energy Union” already 
working within its borders, would also give a credible background to a policy aimed at “securing 
the energy surroundings” with key neighbours. But we are still so far from it. What did we 
achieve this past decade with Ukraine, or Turkey or Azerbaijan? 
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1. Communications and media regulation: where do we stand?  
The liberalisation process of the 1980s and 1990s created a historical reshuffling of the European 
communications and media industry, from public monopoly to privatisation and competition. 
After the achievement of these goals, in the last ten years the sector has again faced new 
important and decisive changes not only relating to the regulatory/legislative intervention at 
European level, but also as a result of how the technological evolution has deeply affected the 
industry and, even more fundamentally, of the increasingly innovative and disruptive role played 
by the Internet on all the markets.  
More specifically, in the last decade the European industry has faced a profound evolution in its 
regulatory assets as enshrined in the European regulatory framework, the so-called Telecoms 
Package of 2002 (revised and updated in 2009). First, the package has been fully applied across 
all member states; the number of relevant markets – those where, according to the European 
Commission, ex-ante regulation was (and still is) needed - were progressively reduced; 
independent National Regulatory Authorities (NRAs) for electronic communications and their 
coordination body (BEREC) started to play an increasingly crucial role; finally an updated Audio 
Visual Media Services Directive was adopted in 2007, notwithstanding the continuing debate on 
the very role and need for this type of media regulation at the European level.  
When the liberalisation process started, a modern electronic communications regulation was 
introduced as a transitory instrument, with the final aim of being removed once the situation was 
mature enough to leave the market to competition forces. Indeed, we are now at the point in 
which it is worth analysing whether the time has come to limit ex-ante intervention only to the 
presence of the most evident market failures, and to go instead for ex-post control in all other 
cases. In other words, we should ask ourselves if the time is ripe for less regulation and more 
competition.  
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It must be added that the online dimension of businesses calls for a re-examination of traditional 
normative and regulatory instruments that may have become insufficient (or obsolete). Issues 
like privacy of information, copyright and data protection, just to give some examples, might 
require the strengthening of regulation at the European level. This exercise, however, needs to be 
inserted into a broader global dialogue regarding Internet governance worldwide.   
Before analysing the situation as it is now and possible future policy and regulatory approaches 
that might be needed, we briefly summarize the main European regulatory measures introduced 
in the last ten years and their achievements. 
As previously mentioned, the regulatory framework for electronic communications mainly aimed 
at strengthening competition, after the privatisation of States’ monopolies and the liberalisation 
of the industry was set up in 2002. The package was composed of a Framework Directive and 
four specific Directives, respectively: the Authorisation Directive; the Access Directive; the 
Universal Service Directive and Privacy and the Electronic Communications Directive
1
. This 
package was revised and updated in 2009, when it was amended and integrated with the Better 
Law-Making, the Citizens Rights and the BEREC Directives,
2
 but was not fundamentally 
changed.  
The extension of the market coverage of the package was thought of as a variable from its very 
inception. According to article 15 of the Framework Directive, the Commission shall adopt a 
Recommendation on relevant products and services markets (Relevant Markets 
                                                 
1
 Directive 2002/21/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on a common regulatory 
framework for electronic communications networks and services (Framework Directive); Directive 2002/20/EC of 
the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on the authorisation of electronic communications 
networks and services (Authorisation Directive); Directive 2002/19/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 7 March 2002 on access to, and interconnection of, electronic communications networks and associated 
facilities (Access Directive); Directive 2002/22/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 
on universal service and users' rights relating to electronic communications networks and services (Universal 
Service Directive); Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 2002 concerning 
the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector (Directive on 
privacy and electronic communications). To which the Decision No 676/2002/EC of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 7 March 2002 on a regulatory framework for radio spectrum policy in the European Community has 
been added. 
2
 Directive 2009/140/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2009 amending Directives 
2002/21/EC on a common regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services, 2002/19/EC 
on access to, and interconnection of, electronic communications networks and associated facilities, and 2002/20/EC 
on the authorisation of electronic communications networks and services; Directive 2009/136/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2009 amending Directive 2002/22/EC on universal service and 
users’ rights relating to electronic communications networks and services, Directive 2002/58/EC concerning the 
processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector and Regulation 
(EC) No 2006/2004 on cooperation between national authorities responsible for the enforcement of consumer 
protection laws; Regulation (EC) No 1211/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 
2009 establishing the Body of European Regulators for Electronic Communications (BEREC) and the Office. 
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Recommendation), where, in accordance with competition law, it shall identify those markets the 
characteristics of which justify ex-ante sector-specific regulatory intervention. The Commission 
shall regularly renew the Recommendation and indeed it has done so consistently: regulation 
started with 18 relevant markets in 2002, which were reduced to seven in 2007 and, according to 
the 2014 revision, only five markets now remain in the electronic communications sector that 
still need ex-ante regulation (Market 1: Wholesale call termination on individual public 
telephone networks provided at a fixed location; Market 2: Wholesale voice call termination on 
individual mobile networks; Market 3 a): Wholesale local access provided at a fixed location; 
Market 3 b) Wholesale central access provided at a fixed location for mass market products; 
Market 4: Wholesale high-quality access provided at a fixed location).
3  
Moreover, the Commission adopted a very strong policy stance with regard to the price of 
roaming for travelling European citizens. The approach of direct price intervention against 
roaming overcharges by national companies started in 2007, with the introduction of the capped 
maximum prices and has been pursued through several further reductions. 
With regard to content carried over the electronic communications networks, this is mainly 
regulated by the 2007 Audiovisual Media Services Directive (revised in 2010)
4
, which 
introduced a regulatory and coordination process in the field among EU member states. In 2014 
the European Commission (Decision 3 February 2014, C(2014)/462) decided to establish a new 
European Regulators Group for Audiovisual Media Services, that can be seen as a first step 
towards more centralised coordination between relevant National Regulatory Authorities also in 
this area. Moreover, in parallel with the regulatory intervention in the audiovisual sector, the 
Commission has promoted a regular policy debate on media freedom and pluralism. The High 
Level Group on Media Freedom and Pluralism, the EU Media Future Forum and the Centre for 
Media Pluralism and Media Freedom are all efforts to enhance and stimulate the European 
debate in such a delicate field. 
At the end of 2013 the Commission advanced a new proposal for a Regulation on the Connected 
Continent
5
 in an effort to face the crisis in the sector and to keep up with rapid digital and 
technological developments in many other areas of the world. The proposal focuses on some 
                                                 
3 COM(2014)7174 - Commission Recommendation of 9.10.2014 on relevant product and service markets within the 
electronic communications sector susceptible to ex ante regulation in accordance with Directive 2002/21/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council on a common regulatory framework for electronic communications 
networks and services. 
4 Directive 2010/13/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 10 March 2010 on the coordination of 
certain provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action in Member States concerning the provision 
of audiovisual media services (Audiovisual Media Services Directive) 
5 COM(2013)627 - Proposal for a Regulation laying down measures concerning the European single market for 
electronic communications and to achieve a Connected Continent, and amending Directives 2002/20/EC, 
2002/21/EC and 2002/22/EC and Regulations (EC) No 1211/2009 and (EU)No 531/2012 
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specific aspects that, according to the EC, should be tackled in order to achieve a digital single 
market in the EU, which has been the historical objective of the Union. The specific issues 
addressed by the Connected Continent package are an effort to reduce red tape, to foster 
coordination of spectrum use, to support standardisation, to preserve the open internet, to reduce 
roaming prices and to enlarge consumers’ right. The proposal of the Commission, however, has 
been widely criticized as inadequate given the level of the challenge, incomplete, lacking 
courage, contradictory and, not surprisingly, it is still under discussion. 
Lastly, in May 2014 the Directive on measures to reduce the cost of deploying high-speed 
electronic communications networks
6
 was issued, with the aim of facilitating and incentivising 
the roll-out of high-speed electronic communications networks by reducing its cost. The 
Directive calls for the sharing and re-use of existing physical infrastructure, which are in turn 
expected to make the network deployment more cost efficient. 
It should be noted that, in addition to the above mentioned legislative tools, the European 
Commission has been prolific in issuing numerous soft law instruments in order to facilitate the 
role of decision-makers, regulators, courts and private actors when operating in the 
communications and media sector.   
All the legislative and regulatory measures adopted from 2010 onwards, have as their starting 
point the policy objectives laid down in the Digital Agenda for Europe 2020. The Digital Agenda 
for Europe is composed of 7 pillars: digital single market; interoperability & standards; trust & 
security; fast and ultra-fast Internet access; research and innovation; enhancing digital literacy, 
skills and inclusion, ICT-enabled benefits for EU society. The Digital Agenda is one of the 
flagship initiatives under Europe 2020, aiming to “deliver sustainable economic and social 
benefits from a digital single market based on fast and ultra fast internet and interoperable 
applications”. The Digital Agenda includes a number of very practical goals, most recently 
revised in 2012, which need to be achieved in all member states by 2020. 
How far we remain from these policy goals today and how can a re-examination and revision of existing 
regulation or the introduction of new regulations facilitate their achievement is one of the central topics 
for our present reflection.  
                                                 
6 Directive 2014/61/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014. 
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2. Present challenges and possible responses 
A change of direction for Europe to be competitive in the digital world 
The liberalisation process of the ‘80s and 90’s was accompanied by pervasive regulation of the 
European electronic communications industry strongly oriented by competition principles. This 
regulation focused on networks’ interconnection, access and termination, and was highly 
successful in creating a widespread and lively services competition and even some infrastructure 
competition in most member States. However, today, this specific and sophisticated European 
regulatory construction is trembling under the Internet tornado. 
The Internet has had an innovative but disruptive effect in the communications and media 
markets, completely changing market dynamics, companies’ roles and their business models. 
Indeed, issues such as the explosion of data traffic and of online content, the market convergence 
(both broadband-broadcast and fixed-mobile networks), the protection of online users from a 
number of online threats (and therefore topics like cybercrime, data protection, online copyright, 
etc.), the Internet of things, are currently animating the sector specific debate.  
The Internet revolution has created gigantic Internet native players, the so-called Over The Top 
service providers (OTTs), and has opened a deep tension between these actors (mostly non-
European) and traditional telecommunications companies (Telcos). European Telcos originally 
were - and still are – contemporaneously building networks and offering services through them. 
On the contrary, OTTs started their innovative businesses by providing services without any 
need to worry about building and developing networks, i.e. they simply offer their services 
through existing networks worldwide. 
Despite its tradition of technological excellence and of sophisticated pro-competition regulation, 
in many areas, today Europe apparently lags behind a number of other regions. European 
companies, which were once extremely competitive if not global leaders, appear not to be in a 
position to invest as rapidly as required in new technologies and do not always seem to be able to 
effectively compete with new worldwide Internet giants. Moreover, not only a number of 
European traditional players (especially network builders and device manufacturers) are facing a 
serious crisis, but the right conditions seem to be missing in order to stimulate the establishment 
and growth of new internationally competitive Internet players in the region.  
Considering the political, economic and societal importance of the communications and media 
industry, it is time for Europe to react and transform the digital revolution in an opportunity for 
collaboration, development, innovation, economic growth and job creation. However, this needs 
to be done in an economic context of persistent financial crisis; therefore, the use of public 
resources to finance the construction of broadband and ultra-broadband networks is not an easy 
way out. 
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Looking at the situation as it is now, we can identify two possible future routes for European 
regulation of the sector, namely what we will call respectively the “current route” and the “new 
route”. The current route would basically mean leaving the European regulatory policy to 
continue in its present evolution, trying to progressively adapt and react to technological and 
markets changes. The new route would imply a more proactive approach with the establishment 
of a new balance between ex-ante and ex-post intervention and a more active pursuit of the 
preservation of fundamental rights of European citizens in the digital dimension.  
In what follows, we will explore the pros and cons of these two concepts.  
The current route 
As mentioned, the major aim of the European regulatory intervention was to liberalise markets 
and to remove regulation once competition was been guaranteed. It is undeniable that a number 
of targets have been already positively achieved; in general terms, monopolies have been 
overtaken, the number of competitors has increased, and in various markets a workable level of 
competition has been ensured. Moreover, we have witnessed a spectacular growth in the sector: 
by way of example, mobile telephony has exploded, with a current penetration rate above 130%, 
and at the same time basic broadband coverage has been guaranteed to all European citizens. 
Among the EU regulatory tools that have made these achievements possible, the following 
should certainly be mentioned: the intervention on number portability, which has significantly 
reduced the barriers to migrate among fixed and mobile operators; the lowering of termination 
rates, which has helped especially small operators to apply more competitive off-net prices; the 
unbundling of the local loop, which has created the conditions for more competition and for the 
establishment of flat rates; the separation of cable networks from the incumbents, which in a 
number of cases has been used to reach full divestiture, and, as a consequence, has brought cable 
as another carrier of intermodal competition in the broadband markets and triple play. 
However, as mentioned above, the European Union approach is directed to the removal of 
regulation once a sufficient level of competition has been established on the relevant markets. 
Therefore, the 2002 regulatory framework, after the 2009 revision, should still be viewed from 
this perspective.  
Nevertheless, although the list of relevant markets that, according to the European Commission, 
need ex-ante regulation has been regularly updated and significantly reduced, pervasive 
regulation still characterises the sector in Europe. Today, these regulatory instruments are called 
into question, especially because of the birth and rapid growth of the Internet and the growing 
role of OTT companies. Indeed, it is fair to say that the OTTs, that are mainly non-European 
companies, currently do not fall under the scope of application of the majority of European 
regulations, as they do not qualify as electronic communications service providers under the 
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European framework. Moreover, while the incomes of OTTs are constantly growing, traditional 
Telcos have been facing a prolonged trend of decreasing profits, and even losses, over the last 
years. The final consequence of this situation is that today, quite incredibly, the development of 
the Internet, instead of being perceived as an immense opportunity, rather appears like a threat 
for a large number of European players. 
In this context, maintaining the “current route”, would have a number of consequences that 
prima facie seem to leave unresolved several relevant issues: 
1. the permanence of the OTTs - Telcos conflict;  
2. the lack of a common level playing field;  
3. the commoditisation of the European networks;  
4. the limited incentives to invest;  
5. the increasing risk of business dispersion and disruption;  
6. the increase in fiscal conflicts. 
When analysing the current status of the electronic communication markets, and in particular the 
impact of the Internet, one has to start from the more active role of users/consumers in the digital 
era. Indeed, changing consumers’ behaviours are at the basis of many new business models, 
because consumers constantly enhance the demand for online services and products and are 
asking for a fully connected world of services. In this context the conflict between OTTs and 
Telcos is the first issue that dominates the current debate. As already mentioned, OTT players 
are companies that offer their products and services on the Internet, which implies that, because 
of their very nature, they can only exist if there is an efficient and fast Internet broadband 
connection. In Europe, Telcos are the traditional Internet Service Providers (ISPs) that offer 
Internet connections to users. Looking at the issue in a very simple way, this means that Telcos 
play a basic and crucial role in the Internet ecosystem, as they are essential for the economic 
service chain to work. At the same time, OTTs, because of their innovative services, which 
match consumers' demand extremely well, are strengthening the need for ever faster Internet 
connections (mobile and fixed). In this respect, OTTs and Telcos start from a market position 
that has an important element of complementarity.  
On the other hand, however, more and more new services offered “for free” by OTT players, 
which are essentially financed through advertising or the exploitation of other multisided markets 
externalities, directly compete with and crowd out services for which Telcos traditionally charge 
consumers using their networks (e.g Voice vs. VoIP, SMS vs. Instant Messaging). Thus, if on 
one side there is complementarity between the two actors – the need for more fast and ultra-fast 
broadband connections signifies new revenues for telecommunications operators -, on the other 
side there is direct service competition. Especially in the latter case, the current regulatory 
asymmetry between the two categories of actors appears problematic.  
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This leads to the perceived lack of a common level playing field. Telecommunications operators 
and OTTs indeed compete in a number of markets, the most immediate, as already mentioned, 
being the provision of voice calls and text messages (and they may soon start to compete also on 
Internet service providing). However, as mentioned above, the two players have to deal with 
different regulatory burdens (e.g. rules on access to competitors, universal service obligations, 
users’ rights, security, price/cost regulation), which presently do not guarantee competition on 
equal terms. Theoretically speaking, the problem could be tackled in two different ways: by 
extending pervasive regulation also to OTTs or by relaxing part of the current regulation of the 
Telcos. However, extending the current regulatory regime, or even keeping it as it is, does not 
appear to constitute a realistic solution. 
A closely related element of friction, which has generated a lively debate, is the risk perceived by 
traditional network operators of the progressive commoditisation of their services. If this 
happened, the economic interest in infrastructure investments would unavoidably decrease. The 
non-differentiation of products/services for Telcos would mean low profits and relatively lower 
interest in investing. However, the boom in data traffic, mainly due to OTT services, is 
challenging the existing infrastructures and, at the same time, consumers expect the level of 
Quality of Service (QoS) to be constantly improved, which is something that can only be ensured 
with innovation and investments in the networks. Over the last years, Europe has suffered an 
evident slowdown in infrastructure investments - which basically means in Next Generation 
Networks (NGN) - by several, if not all, major telecommunications operators. This cannot be 
explained only by the financial crisis of recent years, while it seem to confirm that Telcos have 
partially lost an economic incentive in investing when this is perceived as a way to further favour 
competing OTTs’ services without creating an adequate opportunity of profit for themselves.  
Worldwide, the enormous emphasis on the need for infrastructure investment in NGNs has often 
led authorities to public investment and/or to soften access regulation (both of copper and NGN 
infrastructures). While in the U.S. this resulted in the deregulation of fiber infrastructures already 
in 2002-2005, the EU has only now partially followed suit by recently softening price regulation 
of NGN wholesale access. Nonetheless, the EU leaves the door open for more stringent 
regulation if inter-modal competition and the competition from copper access prove to be 
insufficient. Given the highly uneven distribution of inter-modal competition in the EU, the new 
policy results in a strong reliance on competition from copper. However, the more successful 
NGA penetration, the less pressure can be expected from copper competition. Since efficient 
regulation in this area depends on the degree of urbanisation, population density and prior 
infrastructures, it is not clear if this is the most appropriate general policy, given that most 
residents of the EU do not have access to broadband cable. This may suggest implicitly or 
explicitly the necessity of revising the current regulatory framework, to provide for a 
geographical differentiation of access regulation. 
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A crucial issue, which has accompanied the policy debate concerning the Internet from its early 
days, and is closely related to the network investments issue, regards the so-called net neutrality 
principle. The Internet protocol permits every connected user to access all possible available 
content thanks to the Internet openness and non-discrimination features. This has always been 
regarded as one of the main reasons for its powerful and rapid development. Net neutrality is the 
policy standard through which these features are guaranteed. It means that all content should be 
treated equally, disregarding of the amount of bandwidth required and of the level of demand it 
generates. At present, in Europe, only two countries, the Netherlands and Slovenia, have adopted 
a law to establish a clear rule in favour of a net neutrality approach. The European regulatory 
framework explicitly states that NRAs should promote the interests of the citizens by, inter alia, 
“promoting the ability of end-users to access and distribute information or run applications and 
services of their choice” and introduces the competence of NRAs to set minimum quality of 
service requirements in order to prevent degradation of service (Directive 2002/22/EC). These 
provisions have to be fulfilled with transparency obligations regarding the terms of service to 
apply to operators (Directive 2002/22/EC).  
The current regulatory framework, in brief, provides for a universal access to information for 
Internet users, together with the obligation of transparency regarding the various terms of use of 
the Internet connection and with a possibility for NRAs to set minimum quality standards. What 
has happened in the market, in fact, is that bandwidth-intensive applications, such as VOIP or 
P2P, have been in rare circumstances subject of blocking or throttling behaviours from ISPs, 
beyond the necessary traffic management (BoR (12) 30). Competition policy can play a role in 
these cases, but only in sanctioning abusive discriminatory behaviours from operators with 
significant market power. ISPs argue that the chance to charge content providers differently, 
based on their demand for bandwidth, would be essential to induce the right incentives to invest 
in the network, in times when the demand for bandwidth-intensive applications - “specialised 
services” - is constantly increasing and the incentives to invest are hampered by the economic 
crisis. On the other hand, if the “specialised services” were allowed to pay for a faster lane on the 
ISPs network, the fear is that they would grow at the expense of the best effort Internet and that 
they would fragment the market in many different Internets, whereas the strength of the online 
protocol has always been its ubiquitous and uniform access to all information, giving rise to an 
exceptional richness in the generated content. At present, the European Parliament is working on 
the Connected Continent package, which contains a stronger and open position in favour of net 
neutrality.  
Business dispersion is another issue that is strictly related to the general conflict between OTTs 
and network providers. Services like text messaging and voice are increasingly IP based and this 
represents another serious and imminent challenge for the traditional business models and the 
economic equilibrium of telecommunications operators. In order to provide services that are 
competitive compared to the ones offered by OTTs, Telcos would need to re-adapt their business 
models and probably foster collaborative/partnership solutions with OTTs. However, the current 
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regulatory asymmetry may constitute an obstacle, certainly not the only one, for network 
operators in their need to evolve their business models, as they have to comply with a number of 
restrictive rules that do not concern OTT competitors. 
Another asymmetric element among the two typologies of actors which is seen as an increasing 
reason of concern regards the level of interoperability: Telcos are regulated to apply strong 
interoperability rules, but OTTs often are not, i.e. you cannot communicate with a Whatsapp user 
unless you are on the Whatsapp network. The lack of interoperability sometimes constitutes an 
essential feature of these new business models. In practice, OTTs often compete with each other, 
fragmenting the service space and creating multiple walled gardens rather than an open 
interoperable scenario. The dual system of open and closed solutions might need to be further 
assessed in terms of competition and consumers welfare concerns.  
Asymmetries between OTTs and network providers and thus the lack of a level playing field are 
also reflected in the fiscal conflict the two kinds of players are facing. So far OTTs have had the 
possibility of profiting from favourable fiscal regimes, which is not normally the case for 
national Telcos. In particular, while the latter do have to pay taxes in the country in which they 
have their network and sell their services, it is easier for OTTs to change the fiscal location of 
their activity and choose countries where the fiscal burden is lower. Recent investigations opened 
by DG Competition with regard to a number of Internet players aim to ascertain whether their 
profiting from preferential fiscal treatments may hide indirect State aid provisions.  
In conclusion, there are a number of reasons for suggesting that the adoption of the current route 
does not seem to constitute a feasible solution in order to cope with all the current challenges of 
the communications and media sector in Europe and to reach a win-win situation for all actors. It 
is clear that, if no rigorous and timely action is taken to adapt the existing sector-specific 
regulation on a regular basis, in such a rapidly changing environment, it will be exposed to the 
risk of becoming obsolete. 
Choosing the “current route” would mean abdicating the responsibility to face the real issues of 
relaxing excessive regulation, promoting European companies, fostering collaboration between 
the different players and favouring the diffusion of new business models in order to stimulate 
investments and innovation. The accumulation of too many unresolved conflicts is lowering 
investment and slowing down innovation in the European Union and this trend needs to be 
reversed.  
The new route  
The second path Europe could follow is what we will call the “new route”. In general terms, this 
route does not imply setting aside the results reached by current regulation, but rather 
undertaking a brave revision of motivations, boundaries and tools of regulatory intervention. It 
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also implies carefully looking at market developments and trying to direct them in order to avoid 
market failures, foster innovation and ensure a workable level of competition within the 
European Union.  
In our view, two instruments need to be carefully balanced in this phase to guide industry 
developments: the use of public powers and the self-adjustment process of market forces. 
Clearly, these two instruments reflect different approaches: either an interventionist or a more 
liberal one. 
If we look back at the last 20 years, the dominant approach adopted by the European Institutions 
has been towards the liberalisation of network industries in the interest of innovation and 
consumers’ welfare. In order to achieve these objectives, with regard in particular to electronic 
communications, a number of legislative tools has been used to open up markets, to guarantee 
interconnection, access and termination to legacy networks and to ensure the availability of a 
minimum set of high-quality services for all users at an affordable price.  
However, the European Union is not a State, but a supra-national union with limited 
competences which are conferred to it by its member states; in addition, the use of those 
competences is governed by the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality. Therefore, in 
many areas the European Union cannot directly intervene in order to regulate the markets or to 
impose new rules on market actors. In other words, European Institutions cannot act as a 
regulator outside the scope of the Treaties.  
Nevertheless, what the European Union can do is to intervene in an indirect way. One the one 
hand, it can use a number of instruments to stimulate member states' direct action on the markets. 
On the other hand, it can measure and adjust regulatory ties that are imposed on market operators 
and which lie within its competences. 
In this context, the “new route” may have at its disposal a number of potential actions, each one 
to be considered and balanced in its inherent overall effects: 
1. the revision and direct support to State Aid policy toward the Digital Agenda;  
2. the support to a merger policy toward a European single market;  
3. the reduction of present regulatory burdens;  
4. the largest possible reliance on competition tools;  
5. the use of ex-ante regulation essentially to protect fundamental rights and public interests;  
6. the major recourse to negotiated policies and agreed remedies. 
An example of the first scenario is the strategic use of the State aid rules. It would not be the first 
time that the European Commission uses this instrument to reach specific policy objectives. 
Among others, the EC has already taken this approach with its guidelines for the application of 
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the State aid rules to the broadband sector, which have been shaped in a way to pursue the 
ambitious goals of the Digital Agenda in promoting very fast broadband connections throughout 
the EU. In fact, as it is well known, the guidelines contain a strengthening of open access 
obligations and improved transparency rules; moreover, they allow for well-designed public 
interventions targeted at market failures and aim at ensuring open access to State funded 
infrastructure.  
The limit of this strategy is reached when member states, which are allowed and even invited to 
intervene, find themselves in a condition of funding shortage and thus cannot properly take the 
actions suggested. In this case, a solution would be for the European Union to intervene 
alongside the member States. A possible option is to engage in public-private partnerships (PPP) 
in order to support a particular European industry considered strategic for the future of the 
Union. In fact, this is what the European Commission has started with the 5G Infrastructure PPP, 
the contractual partnership built in order to contribute solutions to important societal challenges 
as identified in the Digital Agenda, for instance energy reduction in network operations or 
optimised radio frequency usage. European investments, alongside member States investments, 
to foster the Digital Agenda results offer a serious possibility in a time of economic crisis and 
limited public resources.   
Another tool that can be used to pursue a European policy in the electronic communications 
sector is the re-orientation of mergers control. Looking at the European communications and 
media ecosystem, we see that a number of Telcos are trying to resist the strong competitive 
pressure exercised by new competitors, essentially the OTT players, by consolidating their 
presence on the market through a scale increase. Thus, they are pursuing a strategy of mergers 
and acquisitions, which is as usual subject to the examination and authorisation by the European 
Commission on competition grounds. A type of scrutiny, especially for cross border mergers, 
that strengthens and favours a truly European dimension of the industry in the direction of a 
single market, could leave players more freedom to redefine market forces equilibrium.  
Another type of intervention that could be tailored to helping European markets is by easing 
certain regulatory burdens currently imposed on market players in order to increase their 
possibilities of operating. Here again it is possible to identify a number of concrete examples.   
The European Union could rapidly pull back from those markets where a workable degree of 
competition is established. This seems to be the approach followed in the recently adopted 
revised Recommendation on relevant product and service markets within the electronic 
communications services. In industries such as communications and media, where technological 
change is quick and has a strong impact on market dynamics, the de-regulation exercise might be 
the most effective solution. In fact, commercial agreements and business strategies are well 
placed to cope with the rhythm of technology developments, while regulation is unavoidably 
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slower. However, close attention should be paid in order to guarantee that, even in these cases, a 
workable level of competition is always ensured on the marketplace.  
Another option is the possible move from regulation to competition policy. In general, 
competition policy is not fit to deal with externalities and discriminatory practices in the absence 
of established market power, but it could become much more relevant in the current historical 
period where the tension between Telcos and OTTs is strong. Market de-regulation with ex-post 
control should be complemented with lower levels of regulation such as transparency 
requirements, especially on QoS and minimum quality regulation for basic services. This is 
particularly true when considering the issue of net neutrality, regarding which it needs to be 
guaranteed that ISP's traffic management techniques are transparent and do not hide 
discriminations, and that a minimum quality of connection is ensured even after the introduction 
of specialised services, which can be allowed only if there is enough capacity and not to the 
detriment of already existing services. Nonetheless, given the weak empirical incidence of net 
neutrality violations, even on this important topic it would be advisable to give priority to 
competition policy and activate new ex-ante regulation only when and if it is clear that 
competition policy is not sufficient.  
Externality-related beneficial outcomes could also, potentially, be achieved by strengthening the 
consumer protection bureaus in competition policy agencies. In this scenario, there might be a 
need to re-shape the relation between ex-ante (regulation) and ex-post (competition) 
interventions. Probably the organization of a common task force of competition enforcers and 
regulators, both at European and national level, as was done at the beginning of the liberalisation 
process, could constitute a valid instrument to reassess the equilibrium of the markets, identify 
new situations of dominance, and redesign the borders between regulation and competition 
intervention.   
In principle, our belief is that ex-ante intervention should be mainly used to protect fundamental 
rights and public interests, while the rest of policy objectives could be left to ex-post 
intervention. In other words, the European Commission should re-examine the core motivation 
behind each regulatory intervention and confirm only those aimed at the protection of European 
citizens’ fundamental rights and freedoms or those that are essential to preserve a workable level 
of competition.  
This is certainly the case for privacy and data protection, the safeguard of which should be 
equally ensured both in the offline and online dimensions of the communications and media 
market. Indeed, data play a fundamental role in the current and future sector dynamics as it has 
become an essential asset for many businesses; thus, in line with the need of a common level 
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playing field, the issue needs a regulatory approach that applies to the different players
7
. 
Consumers’ trust in the online environment is at the basis of the latter’s further development (be 
it with regard to online services and products, to e-commerce but also to the Internet of things 
and smart cities). In the long term, enhancing such trust will represent an added value both for 
OTTs and Telcos.  
Taxation is another major front. The fiscal system is supposed to guarantee the redistribution of 
national wealth and to provide the State with the resources it needs to be able to perform the 
essential services and to comply with its solidarity duties. However, we have seen that Internet 
businesses create a conflict between the concept of “permanent establishment”, on which tax 
rules are based, and the digital presence of firms in one country or another. It is now clear that 
the issue cannot be solved by market forces and a regulatory intervention, at the appropriate 
level, is needed.   
While shaping these specific regulatory tools, due attention should be paid, on the one side, to 
the fact that companies operating in the communications and media ecosystem often have a 
global dimension. Therefore, any attempt to regulate those firms’ behaviours exclusively within 
national, and sometimes even regional, boundaries is bound to be doomed. On the other side, 
global political actors and global powers are a scarce commodity. Two conclusions may be 
derived from this situation: first, any step the Commission will take has to be assessed looking at 
the European communications and media markets not in isolation, but as an integral part of a 
global Internet ecosystem and, second, European firms should be put in a condition to be able to 
compete on the global scene.  
Focusing on media, the AVMS Directive introduced the pillar principle of the “country of 
origin”. However, content is increasingly moving online and consequently the way audiovisual 
media products are consumed is deeply changing and new market players have entered the scene 
(e.g. social networks, search engines, online content providers, etc.). The foreseen 2015 revision 
of the Directive should respond to the current changes in consumers’ behaviours and anticipate 
future trends. Convergence is the core of the current revolution, in the context of the revision 
process it is of great importance to strictly coordinate the AVMS Directive with the relevant 
legislation in the electronic communications sector. Moreover, it may also be important to 
consider the establishment of independent and coordinated (at European level) National 
Regulatory Authorities, along the lines of what happened for the electronic communications 
sector. 
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Another issue, which is central to the debates in both the electronic communications and media 
sector and that is strongly related to media convergence, is online copyright. The consequence of 
the current situation, which is mainly based on an obsolete Directive that leads to a “country by 
country approach”, is that in the EU there are 28 different legislations, inevitably constituting a 
threat to the single market. Indeed, the situation as it stands today is problematic both for creators 
and for consumers. In fact, the latter are facing issues such as content that is accessible only in 
some member states (blocked in others), content from home country that is not accessible when 
in other EU member states, content from home country for which a subscription has been paid 
that is not accessible when in other member states, content offered at different prices and 
conditions in the different EU countries. With regard to the authors, it is obvious that the online 
world constitutes both an opportunity (lowering costs for production and distribution) and a 
threat (piracy definitely becoming easier online). The need for a new future proof regulation that 
takes into account the progressive technological developments is self-evident. 
In synthesis, we suggest that where no fundamental rights are at stake or an immediate danger 
for competition is present, the European Commission could de-regulate and rely on commercial 
negotiations among players as the driving force for market developments. We have mentioned 
that, in our view, firms are better placed to cope with the fast pace of technological changes and 
to adopt a cross-sectorial approach which is more in line with the convergent trend of a number 
of markets, as opposed to sector-specific regulations, and thus can better contribute to the 
creation of a level playing field among different actors.  
In any circumstance, a workable degree of competition should always be guaranteed on the 
marketplace. No return to a monopolistic situation can be in the interest of European consumers 
and citizens. As a consequence, an ex-post intervention of the European Commission is desirable 
any time there is a need to correct market failures, stimulate innovation and contribute to the 
maintenance of a competitive and effective business environment.  
However, also when antitrust issues arise, the specificity of the ecosystem at stake is to be taken 
into due account. In fact, the communications and media markets change at a very fast pace. 
Therefore, the European Commission or NCAs should assess whether the intervention could be 
able to correct market failures in a reasonable amount of time. If the answer is negative, it may 
be wiser to adopt a “wait and see” approach, observing how companies and society react to the 
market failure in the short-term. 
On the contrary, if an intervention is deemed to be in any case essential, and time is a decisive 
factor, it may be the case that relying on persuasion, and thus engaging in negotiations with the 
undertakings concerned, could pay out more than adopting a punishment strategy, which is 
unlikely to be truly effective when technological realities change too quickly and obligations 
with a detailed content are unlikely to remain up to date. 
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In conclusion, a “new route” for the future of the European communication and media industry 
could be an optimal and balanced mix of more public policy toward investment in NGNs, more 
cross border consolidation, less ex-ante regulation, a fair amount of ex-post competition control, 
a strong regulatory presidium of fundamental rights of European citizens, and a new capacity to 
negotiate market solutions with players.   
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The overarching goal of the European Union is the creation of a Single European Transport Area 
(SETA) and the completion of the Internal Market for the transport of goods and passengers. 
This was outlined in the 2011 White Paper (COM(2011)144), accompanying Staff Working 
Document (SEC(2011)391) and the Single Market Act II (COM(2012)573). Corresponding 
activities of the European Union date back to the Rome Treaty (1957) and have mainly been 
undertaken in a sector specific approach, i.e., transport mode by transport mode. This 
overarching objective raises a series of challenges in all the transport modes.  
The Florence School of Regulation Transport Area (FSR-Transport) has focused, so far, on four 
of these modes, namely railways, air transport, urban public transport and maritime transport 
(waterways). We have not addressed road transport yet, which will therefore not be covered by 
this Manifesto. However, we will address postal and delivery services, which have been a 
traditional activity of FSR-Transport and FSR-Communications and Media jointly. Furthermore, 
transport is intrinsically international. However, in this section we do not cover the role that the 
EU does and should play in the global arena and focus exclusively on the challenges that arise 
from the goal of creating an internal European transport market. Also, we take for granted the 
commitments of the EU in matters of safety, security and environmental protection. In this 
introduction, we will briefly present the five main challenges of the EU when it comes to 
creating a Single European Transport Area, as we see them, namely (1) the elimination of 
barriers between States and modes, (2) market distortion and competition, (3) the introduction of 
the Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs), (4) decarbonisation, and (5) social 
sustainability. All these challenges will be found again in the discussion of each transport mode 
below. 
The first and most important challenge for the EU is the elimination of barriers between Member 
States and modes. More precisely, there is the challenge of harmonizing the historically national 
approaches to transport, which are most visible in the railway sector. Yet there are limits to 
harmonization as countries and their transport systems also vary, and because of regional 
specificities, not the least due to different geographic situations. Such harmonization pertains to 
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technical matters (interconnection and interoperability), to financing and to institutional setup, as 
they all have the potential to lead to market distortions in the different transport modes between 
countries as well as between the transport modes themselves. Indeed, there is also the challenge 
of integrating the different transport modes into a coherent intermodal European transport 
system. 
The basic EU approach to network industries has always been one of distinguishing between the 
infrastructures on the one hand and the services provided on the basis of these infrastructures on 
the other. This approach is also systematically applied in the different transport sectors. From 
this theoretical separation a series of challenges related to market distortion and competition 
arises. First, the legal framework should be stabilised: the focus between 2014 and 2018 should 
be put on effective and symmetric implementation of this framework in Member States. 
Secondly, a readjustment of the intermodal framework conditions is needed in order to improve 
the competitiveness of rail, in particular through correct application of the internalisation of 
external costs principle and in order to prevent one-sided increases in factor costs. Thirdly, the 
Commission should focus on the problem of insufficient infrastructure funding by providing 
assistance through EU-funding. Fourth, the Commission will have to deal with the imperfect 
market situation that has been caused by un-harmonized subsidies and framework conditions 
between the transport modes as well as between the countries. Last but not least, a new approach 
to pricing is needed: the costs of transport should be reflected in its price, which means that both 
correct and consistent monetary incentives and user charges should be applied. 
New technologies and innovation (meaning research and deployment) will play a key role in the 
establishment of both the SETA and of economically, environmentally and socially sustainable 
infrastructure operations. The introduction of the Information and Communication Technologies 
(ICTs) in the different transport modes (for instance through research and development such as 
Shift2Rail and the various technologies developed under the SESAR
8
 framework for the air 
sector), as well as supporting their implementation, is one of the most urgent tasks for European 
policy makers. In short, the main challenge for the new Commission pertains to two aspects: on 
the one hand, the Commission has to build a legislative framework that favours rather than stifles 
technical innovation and, on the other hand, the new legislation should promote technological 
innovation and related standards in a way that reduces market distortions. 
Transport is particularly energy-intensive. As energy, especially in transport, still stems mainly 
from fossil fuels, another very important challenge is to decarbonize the different transport 
modes without sacrificing their efficiency and without curbing mobility. There are two main 
components to achieve the reduction of oil dependence and the reduction of greenhouse gas 
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emissions, namely a more efficient use of resources and the phasing out of carbon fuelled 
vehicles. 
The other cross cutting challenge relates to the social sustainability of transport: the SETA can 
and should only be achieved in compliance with the respect of working conditions and 
passengers’ rights. Reform processes have to be accompanied with an appropriate level of 
involvement of the concerned groups namely staff representatives and passenger associations. 
The challenge is to guarantee that this is respected on the European as well as on the national and 
regional levels. 
The Commission has developed several principles that relate to all modes of transports. Now the 
aim is to look at transport regulation as mobility regulation and to overcome the fragmented 
sectoral approach. This is essential to addressing what should be the central reference point for 
regulation: the needs of the users. Passengers and freight transport customers alike need reliable, 
efficient and affordable connections. To provide for these, while simultaneously promoting the 
use of more sustainable modes of transport, an intermodal approach indispensable. Yet to 
evaluate the specific state of play in the diversely structured transport sectors, it is important to 
examine the challenges in the railways, the air transport, the urban public transport, the 
waterways and the postal and delivery sectors separately. 
1. Railways  
The past decade has seen extensive changes and new initiatives in the de- and re-regulation of 
railways at the European level. To recall, the ultimate goal of the Commission is to create a 
Single European Railway Area (SERA). The strategy to achieve this vision was set out in the 
First Railway Package of 2001. However, the first initiative to extend the Single Market to the 
Railway Sector dates back to 1991 (91/440/EC). After almost 25 years of regulatory fine-tuning 
and new legislative initiatives, the general institutional framework and the broad market structure 
are taking shape. Today, the main focus of the European Commission lies on the transposition of 
the so-called Recast of the First Railway Package (2012/34/EU) as well as on the completion of 
the Fourth Railway Package. 
State of play and achievements 
The Commission’s “regulatory toolkit” for the network industries is proving particularly 
challenging when applied in the case of the railway sector. Consequently, many of the proposed 
concepts are not yet implemented. The Commission’s main achievements pertain to the 
organization of railway undertakings, to railway regulation and to infrastructure development. 
The Organization of Railway undertakings: to recall, the Commission advocates a model of full 
vertical separation between transport services and infrastructure management so as to guarantee 
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fair market conditions for new entrants. So far, two models of railway organization have 
emerged: some Member States have fully separated the railway infrastructure from transport 
operations (e.g., Denmark, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the UK), while other Member States 
have implemented a holding model as is the case in Austria, Germany, Greece, Italy, Poland and 
France. However, there is today no general consensus as to the optimal model for the 
organization of railway undertakings. The regulation allows both the integrated and the fully 
separated model. The argument from the supporters of a more integrated railway system is that 
vertical separation prevents overall system optimization, causes duplication of fixed costs and 
may reduce the potential for technical innovation covering all stakeholders in the rail system.  
The current legislation foresees that this “freedom of organizational structure” should not be 
questioned. Directive 91/440/EU, Directive 2001/14/EU and the Recast have already introduced 
independent management for State-owned railway undertakings along with legal, organisational 
and accounting separation as well as functional separation (regarding the ‘essential functions’ 
track access and track pricing) between the infrastructure manager and the railway undertaking. 
The Commission’s proposals for the 4th Railway package would introduce even stricter 
unbundling requirements for all tasks of the infrastructure manager by extending the definition of 
essential functions. The Commission further supports a ‘verification clause’ according to which 
integrated railway companies could be banned from operating abroad, if they do not guarantee 
free access in their home country (Art. 7, 7a, 7b, 7c, COM(2013)29).  
Independent Regulators and European Railway Agency: just as in the other network industries 
the key element of European railway governance has been the creation of Independent 
Regulatory Bodies (IRBs) to supervise the functioning of the market. Overall, there has been 
significant progress in the establishment of such national regulatory bodies in all the Member 
States. However, full independence and sufficient resources are still not the case everywhere
9
. 
The Recast provides for truly independent regulators constituting a “stand-alone authority which 
is, in organizational, functional, hierarchical and decision-making terms, legally distinct and 
independent from any other public or private entity” (Art. 55, 2012/34/EU). The rail regulator 
may however be part of an integrated cross-sectoral regulator as is practiced for instance in 
Germany and the Netherlands. Full implementation of the Recast will further improve the 
relevance of the regulators, also thanks to the establishment of the “European Network of Rail 
Regulatory Bodies” (ENRRB), which could constitute the nucleus of a future pan-European 
railway regulatory regime. 
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Financing of infrastructure: while ensuring the right level of investments in the whole railway 
sector remains as a major challenge
10
, some important steps in providing a better basis for 
sustainable infrastructure funding have been taken. The TEN-T core network (2013/1315/EU) 
includes, among others, the upgrading to high-speed of more than 15.000km of European railway 
infrastructures, the rail connection between airports and cities, and the connection of ports with 
railways. All these projects are eligible for funding via the Connecting Europe Facility 
(2013/1316/EU)
11
. On the other hand, direct funding by the EU for rail projects has increased 
with a particular focus on freight transport. In particular for the freight sector the right planning 
of infrastructure investments remains crucial. To ensure that investments are made in a way that 
they benefit operators, these have to be included at an early stage. 
Further, the Recast has introduced an important mechanism that should provide appropriate 
funding for the maintenance of rail networks. Also, the network manager has to adopt a plan of 
at least five years, which takes into consideration future mobility needs and determines how 
much funding will be made available for investments in maintenance and renewal. In this way, 
the Recast contributes significantly to a more sustainable railway funding scheme. Another 
important element in the Recast is the obligation for Member States to conclude multi-annual 
financing agreements with infrastructure managers. 
Remaining challenges and possible responses 
Some significant challenges remain when it comes to achieving the Single European Railway 
Area. Besides financing, which remains before all a national challenge, the Commission must 
progress especially in the areas of transparency, technology, passenger transport and inter-modal 
competition. 
Transparency remains as a key challenge. It serves as an important tool for a more efficient rail 
sector in several aspects. To recall, the Third Railway Package had already introduced more 
transparent procedures for Public Service Obligations. But the Fourth Railway Package will now 
also require a coherent justification for direct tenders of such Public Service Obligations. 
Transparency is also needed in matters of Access Charges, as this will help overcome distortions 
resulting from (non-transparent) pricing mechanisms as applied by some infrastructure 
managers. With regard to transparent track access pricing, rules are laid down in Directive 
2001/14/EU. Further, the Commission is working on an implementing act based on Article 31 (3) 
of the Recast which sets out consistent and transparent principles for taking into account direct 
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costs for the calculation of track access charges. With regard to the transparency of capacity 
allocation, Directive 2001/14/EU and Article 38 et seq. of the Recast provides strict rules for 
clear capacity allocation processes. With regard to the transparency of financial flows within 
railway undertakings, Art. 6 (4) of the Recast on Separation of Accounts already contains strict 
rules on the prohibition of transferring public funds from one activity to another and extends the 
rights of the regulatory authority to control these financial funds. These rules must be 
implemented. Finally, in its first reading of the Fourth Railway Package, the European 
Parliament proposed a financing cycle: unless profits are retained within its business, the 
infrastructure manager’s profits may only be used for a single purpose - the payment of a 
dividend to the ultimate owner, who in turn is obliged to completely reinvest these resources in 
the infrastructure.  
Implementation of common technical standards/interoperability: railway technology, notably 
technological harmonization and especially the harmonization of technical standards remains a 
major impediment both for both freight and passenger transport companies to operate in different 
markets. The creation of the European Railway Agency (ERA) in 2004 (Regulation (EC) No 
881/2004) and the parallel introduction of the Technical Standards for Interoperability Directive 
(2004/50/EC) have been a first step towards interoperability. However, numerous technical 
market entry barriers due to technical problems still exist such as lengthy and costly vehicle 
authorisation procedures which directly impact the competitiveness of rail transport in Europe. 
The Fourth Railway Package addressed these issues to a significant extent. Actually, the so-
called Technical Pillar seems to be the least controversial
12
 of the Commission’s recent 
initiatives, introducing, among others, a single safety certificate that would be valid and 
recognized in all Member States. While this would mean a major improvement for all cross-
border rail operations, much remains to be done. Almost 50% (in t/km) of the EU rail freight 
market is international, but the rail freight sector faces immense obstacles from the lack of 
harmonized technical standards and lengthy procedures for authorizations of rolling stock. As for 
the institutional side, the role of the European Railway Agency will also need to be strengthened.  
National passenger transport: the Fourth Railway Package aims at the liberalization of passenger 
transport to be completed by 2019. Member States have made varied progress and will continue 
to have different views on the role of competition in the different areas of passenger transport. 
The opening of the national passenger market will therefore be very controversial. Also, there 
will be a conflict of models: while the Commission foresees that the majority of the passenger 
transport will follow competitive open market model, competition in the market today still 
remains the exception and most of the competitively awarded transport lines in Europe remain 
                                                 
12
 7
th
 Florence Rail Forum “The Technical Pillar of the 4th Railway Package: Challenges for Standardisation and 
Interoperability” (Florence, 27 May 2013) 
42 
attributed along the competition for the transport model. Therefore, the Commission’s approach 
has evolved in this regard and PSOs are generally accepted. 
Intra-modal and inter-modal competition: there is indeed little progress when it comes to 
creating a level playing field for intermodal competition. One of the major, if not the most 
important remaining challenges is the alignment of costs for using road and rail infrastructures, 
as well as the internalization of externalities of the different transport modes. The EU set the goal 
to reach a 30% shift from road freight to rail freight for journeys of over 300 km by 2030 and 
over 50% by 2050. This goal is however already now almost impossible to achieve, as there is no 
clear cross-modal strategy to implement it. If the ambitious goal of a level playing field is to be 
taken seriously, it will be necessary to include modal shift as a goal also in the other transport 
modes. 
2. Air Transport 
The removal of barriers towards an internal air transport market has made significant progress 
during the 2
nd
 Barroso Commission, especially in matters of competition among air transport 
carriers. Nevertheless, more than in other sectors, concerns about national sovereignty continue 
to determine the agenda of European aviation policy, as is particularly visible in the case of the 
Single European Sky, which has turned out to be the main focus of the Barroso Commission. 
State of play and achievements  
To recall, the European aviation policy is concerned with the rules for the internal market for air 
services, airports, international agreements, the integration of the European airspace, air safety 
and security, passenger rights, and environmental protection. 
Prior to the Barroso Commission, air transport liberalization was achieved by way of three air 
transport packages, resulting in the creation of the internal air transport market as of January 
1993. "Stand alone cabotage", the ninth and last so-called Freedom of the Air was realized in 
1997, thus completing the internal market for air transport services. As a result, especially 
former national flag carriers have come under pressure by low cost airlines, forcing a 
concentration process among them. On the other hand, low cost airlines have grown 
exponentially since and account today for approx. 25% of European air transport market share.  
Also in the 1990s, measures were taken to facilitate the access of airlines to key infrastructures 
and services. In 1993 the EU Council started to regulate airport slot allocation by way of its 
Regulation (EEC) No 95/93, which, as variously amended, remains the only piece of European 
legislation in this matter. The aim of this regulation was to offer certain priorities to new entrants 
when it comes to allocating recently available slots. However, 8 years later the effectiveness of 
this Regulation remains highly contested by new entrants, as well as by experts, as capacity 
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remains scarce at many European airports at peak hours. As a result, the Commission is currently 
proposing new legislation to amend the slot allocation regulation focusing in particular on a slot-
trading approach (COM/2011/0827). The proposal that is part of the so-called “better airport 
package” has however not yet been adopted. 
Similarly, the market for ground-handling services was opened by EU Directive in 1996 (EC 67/ 
1996). The aim of this Directive was to make ground-handling services more cost-efficient as 
well as to increase their quality. As part of the better airports package the Commission plans to 
replace and repeal this regulation to guarantee a more efficient system and the complete 
liberalization of ground handling services. The proposal (COM/2011/0827) that was brought 
forward in 2011 is however still under negotiation between Parliament and Council. The 
Commission proposal foresees, amongst others, a minimum number of three service providers 
for ground handling services at larger airports.  
Also, the European Court of Justice confirmed the Commission’s legitimacy in negotiating 
international air services agreements in 2002 with a special focus on its Open Skies ruling 
(Judgments of the Court, 5 November 2002). Since then, the European Commission has been 
successful in negotiating a large number of Air Services Agreements with third countries, most 
of them replacing the existing bilateral agreements between the Member States and third 
countries. The 2
nd
 Barroso Commission has built on these successes and has further structured 
their approach with the 2012 communication “The EU's External Aviation Policy - Addressing 
Future Challenges” (COM(2012)556). It has proven its capability and is now following the right 
approach to its overall external aviation policy. 
The Single European Sky (SES) initiative was launched in 2004, with the objective of 
defragmenting the European airspace, yet it remains far from completion. However, in spite of 
failing to implement the Single European Sky by 2009 as was initially set as a goal, some 
achievements were made in the reform of the European Air Navigation Service (ANS) system. 
The most important progress made pertains to the separation of regulatory and service provision 
functions, the establishment of national supervisory authorities in all Member States, the 
designation and certification of Air Navigation Service Providers and the implementation of 
transparent route charging systems as foreseen by the European Regulations of the first SES 
package. The legislative framework for the SES that was established in 2004 was amended by a 
second package of legislation (SESII) in 2009, which set up a new rule making and governance 
framework, leading, among others, to a performance scheme, the creation of Functional Airspace 
Blocks, the Single European Sky Air Traffic Management Research and development program 
(SESAR) and the strengthening of EASA. Another development of the SES framework (SES 
II+) is currently under consideration.  
Commission Regulation 691/2010 established the so-called performance scheme, as performance 
is the central element of the SES2. In order to implement it, a Performance Review Body was 
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assigned by the Commission to set up EU wide performance targets in the key areas of 
environment, capacity/delays and cost efficiency. These performance targets were adopted for 
the first reference period by the Commission in early 2011 (Decision 2011/121/EU). The 
Commission designated the Performance Review Commission of Eurocontrol to act as the 
Performance Review Body and to produce regular reports on the progress towards achieving the 
performance targets. In the field of safety performance, EASA has been tasked with setting up 
safety performance indicators. 
Functional Airspace Blocks (FABs) were already part of the first SES package and further 
enforced in SESII as an intermediate step to a fully integrated Single European Sky. Their 
implementation has been far less successful than hoped. Member States were originally required 
to set up the FABs by the end of 2012; most however failed and the Commission initiated 
infringement procedures. The Commission supported their establishment by making available 
guidance material and by setting up the FAB coordinator who reports regularly on the progress. 
The FABs are furthermore eligible to be supported with funds from the TEN-T. 
The technological pillar enabling the Single European Sky is moving to its crucial phase with the 
deployment of the first solutions developed by SESAR planned for 2015. After the successful 
development of a variety of ATC technologies, the focus now lies on organizing their 
deployment. The Pilot Common Projects are a set of ATM functionalities developed by SESAR 
that are mature enough to be deployed on a cross country scale. Yet the complications in the 
decision making process show the difficulties that will need to be overcome to deploy 
standardized technology in a harmonized and synchronized way. The European ATM Master 
Plan set the course for the technologies to be developed and deployed. It was adopted in 2009 
and revised in 2012. The SESAR JU that was set up to carry out the SESAR program was largely 
successful and in terms of outputs created and research projects completed SESAR has been a 
success. However the transition from development to deployment will be more complex and also 
more conflictual. Stakeholders need to be involved and the Commission has selected a 
deployment manager to carry out this task as of November 2014.
13
 
The role of EASA – the European Aviation Safety Agency – has consistently become more 
important since its foundation in 2002. The SES2 package of 2009 has added a new field of 
responsibility by extending its tasks to include air traffic management and air navigation 
services, as well as the safety of aerodromes (Regulation 1108/2009). EASA works closely with 
the Commission. The regulation has furthermore put EASA in charge of ensuring the proper 
coordination of safety rules. Future institutional developments could expand the mandate of the 
EASA, which could eventually become the European regulator for aviation. 
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One of the biggest concerns in the reform processes of the SES is the appropriate level of 
involvement of staff representations and the regard for the social dimension of the process. The 
challenge is that, while the EU has always stressed this importance on the EU level, it is not 
competent to enforce the same degree of involvement on a national level. The Commission 
advocates a three layered approach consisting of the national, European and FAB level. 
Passengers have benefited from several initiatives by the Commission in the air sector. This has 
been in particular the result of pressure from the European Parliament which has become more 
influential in the last legislative term due the institutional reforms of the Treaty of Lisbon. 
Passengers are now entitled to compensation in the event of denied boarding or loss of luggage. 
The EU set up a website and an information campaign to inform passengers of their rights. 
Nevertheless, passenger rights groups state that these rights are still being enforced poorly. The 
challenge in this field has moved on to enforcing the application of the rules that have been 
adopted. Nevertheless the Commission has taken another initiative to ensure proper enforcement 
of passenger rights in the air sector (COM(2013)130).  
The extension of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) to airlines finally took effect in 2012 
after intense debate, criticism and litigation, leading to a judgment of the European Court of 
Justice confirming the validity of ETS. Technically all airlines flying to, from and within Europe 
must now report their emissions and acquire corresponding allowances. However, the debate is 
not finished, as the ETS for the air sector is currently put on hold for flights going to or coming 
from outside the European Economic Area. This so called “stop the clock” deal has recently been 
extended until 2016 and shall be lifted as soon as a solution for the global level is found through 
International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO). The current situation disadvantages the 
airlines operating only within Europe, however the inclusion of external flights will prove 
extremely difficult, as, for instance, US legislation might forbid US carriers to comply with the 
ETS. In the current situation a lot depends on ICAO’s capability to find a deal that is satisfactory 
for all sides. 
Remaining challenges and possible responses 
In spite of the gradual achievements many substantial challenges remain. 
Implementing the Single European Sky: with the SES2 package the Commission has moved 
towards a strategy of focusing strictly on performance. This can deliver results and bridge 
political resistances, as achieving greater performance is a goal that all Member States can agree 
upon. The problem with this approach is, however, that there are not yet any functional 
sanctioning mechanisms available at the EU level. It has to be acknowledged that, in the current 
system, many important actors do not support the ambitious Commission approach: when there 
is no acute pressure to increase performance because of capacity shortages, national ANSPs do 
not face enough incentives to significantly lower their costs and States are reluctant to 
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compromise on air space sovereignty for the sake of a better performing ATM system. On the 
other hand, there are technical solutions available that can bridge these differences, but they need 
to be implemented, which requires political leadership. These include a shift from monolith 
integrated infrastructures shaped by national considerations to open systems and shared services 
to reduce the costs of individual control centres
14
. 
Noise regulation: a compromise could be found on noise regulation. A corresponding regulation 
was proposed that will harmonize and strengthen rules on operating restrictions at EU airports, 
so as to limit noise-related nuisance, in particular when it comes to night flights (Regulation 
598/2014/EU). It will continue to be difficult for the EU to make decisions in this field without 
infringing on the subsidiarity principle, as this is still considered a responsibility of the region 
where the airport is located. 
Airports, bottleneck on the ground: airports and their capacity can be considered today to be the 
bottleneck to facilitating greater traffic volumes. A more efficient ATM system will eventually 
be limited in its effect if capacities of airports are not used in a more efficient way. This is why a 
lot of effort of the Commission has been focused on improving the performance of European 
airports. The progress in terms of finding a compromise on regulation has however been slow: in 
2011 the Commission proposed a “better airports package” which included three regulations, two 
of which have still not been adopted. Especially slot allocation remains a problem: the proposal 
for a recast regulation on slot allocation should introduce common rules for a more efficient and 
transparent procedure of allocating slots at congested airports. Consequently, airlines will be 
given the possibility to buy and sell airport slots allocated to them. Airport slot allocation could 
also be largely improved if better technical systems were deployed than is currently the case. 
3. Urban Transport 
The European Commission’s actions in the field of urban transport undertaken during the period 
2009-2014 are based on the Green Paper “Towards a new culture for urban mobility” 
(COM(2007)551). In particular, the adoption of the Action Plan on Urban Mobility in September 
2009 is the first result of the broad debate that was opened by the Green Paper on key issues, 
such as greening of towns and cities, smarter urban mobility, as well as more accessible safe and 
secure urban transport. The 2011 White Paper (COM(2011)144) also covered urban transport 
and in 2013 the Commission came up with an Urban Mobility Package (COM(2013)913 and 
related annexes and staff working documents) to address the initiatives called for by the White 
Paper. 
                                                 
14
 4
th
 European Air Transport Regulation Forum (2013) “Consolidating the Single European Sky: From Physical to 
Virtual” (Florence, 22 April 2013) 
47 
Sate of play and achievements 
In line with the principle of subsidiarity, urban mobility is primarily a local responsibility. 
Therefore, different from the other transport sectors, harmonization in urban transport entails 
sharing responsibility between local, national and European authorities. This mainly leads to 
non-binding measures that can be implemented at the national and local levels. In fact, there is a 
long tradition of EU intervention and support in different areas thanks to soft law measures, 
which refer to the definition of the policy framework, funding (both for research and innovation 
and for implementation), facilitation for the exchange of experiences and best practices, along 
with awareness-raising. So far, such sharing of responsibility has been done successfully by the 
Commission. 
The Commission and the Member States thus develop national operational programs based on 
the specific situation of each region and country, namely with the goal of promoting sustainable 
urban public and private transport. In terms of financing, this is mainly and successfully achieved 
by way of co-funding from European programs. The most important such sources are 
Horizon2020 (Mobility for Growth, Green Vehicles, Small Business and Fast Track Innovation 
for Transport), the European Structural and Investment Funds, which allocate several billion € 
for urban mobility projects, along with the CEF funds for TEN-T projects, which include also 
urban nodes. 
The Information and Communication Technologies play a pivotal role in addressing the major 
environmental, societal and health challenges that European cities are facing today. Intelligent 
Transport Systems (ITS) can significantly contribute to a cleaner, safer and more efficient 
transport system. A corresponding new legal framework, aimed at accelerating the coordinated 
deployment and use of intelligent transport technologies across Europe, has successfully been 
adopted in July 2010 (ITS directive 2010/40/EU and following working programme 
C(2011)289). This Directive builds upon the 2008 Action Plan for the Deployment of ITS in 
Europe (COM(2008)886), even though its implementation has been quite slow).  
In order to drastically reduce GHG emissions without reducing mobility, as well as to tackle the 
issues of scarcity and uncertainty of oil supply in the future, the European Commission set the 
following goals in the transport sector: minus 20% CO2 emissions by 2030 (compared to 2008 
levels) and minus 60% CO2 emissions until 2050 (with respect to 1990 levels) 
(COM(2011)144). On the one hand, the promotion of clean and energy-efficient road transport 
vehicles had already been addressed in a Directive (2009/33/EC) that aimed at a broad market 
introduction of environmentally-friendly vehicles. This regulation also refers to the Public 
Procurement Directive and the Public Service Regulation. On the other hand, in January 2013, 
the European Commission published the package Clean Power for Transport (COM(2013)17), 
which has led to the final Directive on the deployment of alternative fuels infrastructure adopted 
by the European Parliament and the Council in September 2014 (2014/94/EU). Since urban areas 
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account for 40% of all CO2 emission from transport, cities need to make more progress in 
shifting towards more sustainable modes of urban mobility. In the 2013 Urban Mobility Package 
(COM(2013)913 and related annexes and staff working documents) the European Commission 
reinforced its support for a competitive and resource-efficient urban mobility
15
.  
Citizens choose whether they want to use a private or a public means of transport. And the 
reasons behind such individual choice is the discriminating factor on which policies should 
focus. The European Commission strongly encourages the use of public transport. However, 
several factors determine the ultimate customer choice and the answer mainly lies at the local 
level. Here, the Commission focuses on the promotion of exchange of best practices aimed at 
assisting public authorities with the implementation of the EU Directives (www.eltis.org) and 
with the development of Sustainable Urban Mobility Plans (SUMP). 
Remaining challenges and possible responses 
Building on the current situation and the path outlined in the recent Urban Mobility Package, the 
main challenges in the urban transport sector for the next legislative period are as follows:  
Keep a local focus in the accomplishment of the Single European Transport Area: there has to be 
the recognition that challenges (congestion, pollution, sustainability of the system from a 
socio/economic/environmental point of view) are common, yet the solutions must ultimately be 
implemented at the local level. Therefore, there is a need for a good balance between binding 
obligations aimed at harmonizing the regulatory framework throughout the EU and subsidiarity. 
Recommendation for coordinated action in specific areas such as urban logistic, access 
regulations, ITS deployment, and road safety are defined in the Urban Mobility Package and 
should be promoted together with the Member States, which will then monitor the 
implementation by the local authorities.  
Funding for innovation and research and funding for implementation: the commitment of EU 
funding for urban transport and smart mobility is clear and the framework for such funding is 
defined. However, the challenge of deployment of the EU funds remains: firstly and foremost, 
research and testing of innovative and integrated strategies addressing energy, transport and 
environmental objectives should be widely supported (for instance extending the scope of the 
CIVITAS initiative); secondly, market introduction of technologies developed thanks to the 
cooperation of public and private actors should be encouraged (such as fuel cells and hydrogen 
as an instrument in achieving a carbon-lean energy system with the FCH JU); thirdly, the 
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involvement of civil society and local communities should be favoured so as to implement 
agreed smart cities solutions along with the exchange of best practices (for instance thanks to the 
EIP-SCC that brings together cities, industry and citizens to improve urban life through more 
sustainable integrated solutions).  
ITS deployment
16
: along with the adoption of the ITS Directive, the European ITS Committee 
and an ITS Advisory Group were established to support the Commission in the implementation 
of the priorities listed in the working programme of this Directive. So far, the ITS Directive has 
been an efficient tool for the rapid adoption of common specifications for the first three priority 
actions (as per the Report released in October 2014 by the European Commission 
COM(2014)642 and related Staff Working Documents). However, some priorities that have not 
successfully been tackled so far and should be re-addressed. Therefore, and in line with the 
major initiative EasyWay (a project for EU-wide ITS deployment on the Trans-European Road 
Network), more should be done in matters of ITS deployment in urban transport. 
Green transport implementation at the urban level: the deployment of alternative fuel 
infrastructures (2014/94/EU) should be the priority for the upcoming legislative period and the 
European Commission should support and monitor the progresses of the Member States in 
performing their tasks. As far as the Clean Vehicles Directive is concerned (2009/33/EC), the 
implementation should also be monitored and favoured in order to allow economies of scale and 
reduce the costs for introducing new technologies. Initiatives, such as the STEER strand of the 
Intelligent Energy Europe programme (focusing on alternative vehicle propulsion, policy 
measures for the more efficient use of energy in transport, and strengthening the knowledge of 
local management agencies in the transport field), along with the Clean Vehicle portal (which 
offers access to database system of vehicle data with the aim to ensure a level of demand for 
clean and energy-efficient road transport vehicles and to encourage manufacturers to invest in 
development of vehicles with low energy consumption, CO2 emissions and pollutant emissions) 
should be promoted.  
Answer citizens’ needs: an attractive public transport and smart mobility incentives: easy access 
to travel information and integrated ticketing are key areas in both the development of an 
attractive transport offer (public authority level) and the awareness-rising of the existence of 
alternatives to private transport (citizens level). Next to the essential behavioural change, 
additional policy actions are needed. Thus, the structural promotion of a sustainable mobility 
culture should be better coordinated with the push for greening public transport fleets, car 
restriction policies, urban road charging schemes and access charging.  
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4. Waterborne Transport: Navigation of Inland Waterways and Maritime 
Transport 17 
The 2011 White Paper (COM(2011)144) can be identified as the most significant policy 
document released by the European Commission with regard to inland waterways and maritime 
transport during the past 2009-2014 legislative period. Some of the aspects mentioned here build 
on the maritime strategy published in the “Strategic goals and recommendations for the EU’s 
maritime transport policy until 2018” (COM(2009)8) and on the positions expressed by the 
European Parliament (2009/2095(INI)) and the Council (PRES/2009/73). From there, and in line 
with the big challenges listed in the introduction of this transport section, one can outline the 
current situation and identify the following remaining challenges in the maritime and inland 
navigation sectors.  
Sate of play and achievements 
Competition in the shipping sector increased significantly over the past years and shipping 
companies are now regrouping so as to gain economies of scale. In spite of the fact that the 
maritime portion used to be the most important element of the shipping value chain, now that the 
ships are increasing in scale, the role of ports and their hinterland becomes as important as the 
purely maritime portion
18
. It can therefore be expected that new, vertical integration will take 
place, mainly because shipping companies will seek to maintain their dominant position in the 
overall value chain. Furthermore, the role of the ports and their development as multi-modal 
nodes is becoming an issue which the European Commission had already started to address in 
specific proposals (COM(2013)296) and via the identification of ports-hinterland connections as 
key challenge for the TEN-T policy (TEN-T guidelines 2013/1315/EU and CEF regulation 
2013/1316/EU).  
The European Commission aims at fostering the use of advanced information and 
communication technologies, as well as at promoting innovation and technological research in 
shipping (EU e-Maritime initiative), with the aim of increasing the global competitiveness of the 
European maritime industry, while at the same time meeting environmental, energy, safety and 
human challenges (COM(2009)8 and 2009/17/EC of the Third Maritime Safety Package). Yet, 
the shipping companies are still in a very dominant position, basically deciding about the 
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technologies they will invest in. Other technologies, which may have higher social or 
environmental cost-benefit ratios, may require incentives, be they financial or regulatory.  
Closely related to the issue of technological innovation is the Commission’s long-term objective 
of “zero-waste, zero-emission”, which also covers the waterborne sector. In this case, this means 
improving traffic management by the deployment of advanced systems (SafeSeaNet and LRIT) 
as well as introducing operational and technical measures (such as cleaner engines, new vessels 
design and shift to low-carbon fuels). Furthermore, Member States and port State authorities are 
required to cooperate to detect illegal discharges and to identify particular ships producing 
pollution offences. The European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA) has been assigned the task to 
assist Member States to this end to respond to maritime ( 2013/100/EU). 
The EMSA also has the task of assisting Member States with the practical implementation of EU 
legislation. Formal Safety Assessments (FSA) which are used to quantify the risks in maritime 
transportation are growing in importance, as safer and more secure shipping is one of the 
priorities of the EU. A comprehensive framework (Directives 2009/15/EC 2009/16/EC 
2009/17/EC 2009/18/EC 2009/20/EC 2009/21/EC, Regulations 2009/391/EC 2009/392/EC) in 
terms of prevention, reaction capacity and resilience are now going to be implemented in 
compliance with the Third package of legislative measures on maritime safety in the European 
Union (COM(2005)585).  
Remaining challenges and possible responses 
Building on the current situation and the achievements of the past legislative period, open issues 
and challenges still remain in the following five areas:  
A Solid European shipping sector vis-à-vis the global competitors: maritime transport remains 
the backbone of goods trade and the European shipping sector is facing global competition, 
especially on the long distance routes from the Far East to Europe. Therefore, there is a need for 
the European Union to work with international partners and to act in the international fora (bi-
lateral agreements with the main partners in the world, World Trade Organisation, International 
Maritime Organisation) to both guarantee quality shipping of the goods that are traded with the 
Member States and to promote the competitiveness of Europe’s shipping sector at the global 
level.  
An integrated and competitive maritime and navigation sector in the multimodal transport chain: 
support to the shipping companies should not result in subsidies to the sector, and must be 
contribute to the objective of integrated mobility. The development of multi-modal logistic 
chains that include maritime operations is the main challenge for the waterborne transport sector 
in both long-distance and short sea shipping. The inclusion of the Motorways of the Sea in the 
TEN-T planning as well as the inclusion of several ports in the TEN-T core network is a good 
52 
starting point, both from a policy point of view and from a financial perspective. Implementation 
should follow. This excludes of course Public Service Obligations (PSO) regulated under the 
Cabotage Regulation (3577/1992/EEC). 
Availability of new technologies: technologies such as SafeSeaNet and LRIT are available and 
should be coherently deployed. Moreover, one of the main open issues for the sector refers to 
unmanned vehicles, which could make the maritime industry more attractive and sustainable. 
Yet, their level of safety still needs to be demonstrated. Legislation currently prohibits unmanned 
ships, but this situation should be examined in the future. 
Greener maritime transport: Member States are still ignoring or failing to implement and 
enforce EU environmental legislation. Here, EMSA should be overseeing compliance. In 
general, environmental issues should be more forcefully addressed.  
Safer and qualitatively better services: the transformation of the maritime safety culture from a 
reactive and prescriptive approach to a proactive and goal-setting regime should be pushed, 
notably by the active involvement of maritime governing bodies (European and international), 
training institutions and shipping companies.  
5. Postal and delivery services19 
The main policy goal to which the current European Commission sees itself committed is the 
achievement of a European single market for goods and services. This overall Commission’s 
goal is reflected in the postal sector as well. Hence, the postal sector in the EU was subject to 
major regulatory changes in the past two decades (Framework Postal Directive 97/67/EC, 
Second Postal Directive 2002/39/EC and Third Postal Directive 2008/06/EC). The adoption of 
the Third Postal Directive is a major step towards the creation of a single market for postal 
services; the last Barroso Commission took it as an asset and focused on its update to guarantee 
better quality and to gain higher effectivity and efficiency for the sector as a whole.  
State of play and achievements 
To complete the EU internal market for postal services, three relevant objectives have been 
identified in the past five years: first, implementation of the Third Postal Directive; second, 
fostering e-commerce and parcel delivery; third, ensuring the application of the State aid 
framework in the context of European Universal Service Obligations (USO). 
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As far as the implementation of the Third Postal Directive is concerned, all Member States have 
established a National Regulatory Authority; in parallel, the European Commission set up a 
European Regulators Group for Postal Services (ERGP) in 2010. Also, significant steps have 
been taken in the field of market opening from collection to delivery of letters and parcels.  
In the EU, e-commerce is governed by the E-Commerce Directive (2000/31/EC), which sets up 
the internal market framework for e-commerce. After more than a decade during which new 
challenges and regulatory needs have emerged
20
, the European Commission published a Green 
Paper in 2012 (COM(2012)698) with the objective to boost e-commerce through establishing an 
integrated parcel delivery market in the EU. The Green Paper was followed by a “roadmap for 
completing the Single Market for parcel delivery” (COM(2013)886), where the Commission 
outlines the main actions that should be taken by the main stakeholders in a well-defined period 
of 18 months in order to: (1) increase transparency and information for costumers and e-retailers, 
(2) improve delivery solutions and (3) enhance complaint handling and redress mechanisms for 
consumers.  
According to the European Commission (SWD(2013)53), postal universal services belong to the 
Services of General Economic Interest (SGEI), namely those services for the overall public good 
that would not be supplied by the market without public intervention. Therefore, a set of criteria 
has been elaborated under which compensations for SGEIs (and therefore postal USO) do not 
constitute State aid (within the meaning of Article 107 TFEU) and do not distort competition.  
Remaining challenges and possible responses 
The Third Postal Directive has been transposed by the Member States into national law within 
the required transition period, but several infringement cases, related to the national 
implementation of the EU law, have been opened. Therefore, the next Commission should keep 
the focus on the implementation and transposition of the Third Postal Directive.  
Beside this, there are two major challenges ahead that relate to fair competition. In fact, despite 
full market opening of the letters market, competition has emerged to a limited extent only, and 
incumbent operators still maintain high market shares. 
The decrease of letter volumes due to the development in the electronic communication sector 
(e-substitution) adds to the risk for possible new entrants. Therefore, the challenge for the 
Commission does not only lay on the regulation of competition in the traditional sector, but also 
in the need of taking into account electronic substitutes (e-commerce, especially in cross-border 
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delivery), possibly starting from the inputs given by the Green Paper “An integrated parcel 
delivery market for the growth of e-commerce in the EU” adopted in 2012.  
Second, a level playing field for all competitors should be ensured by establishing a framework 
for regulating compensation for unfair financial burdens due to USO obligations. With regard to 
this, two related major issues remain open
21
: on the one hand, the definition of an unfair burden 
of the USO and, on the other, the interaction of sector-specific compensation rules with the state 
aid framework. 
Conclusion 
Besides the sector-specific challenges outlined above, there are also some cross-sectoral issues 
affecting all the transport modes alike. These are in fact challenges for DG MOVE as a whole 
and should therefore be approached from a cross-sectoral perspective.
22
 We have already 
mentioned, in the introduction, the main challenges which cut across all the transport modes, 
namely (1) the elimination of barriers between states and modes, (2) market distortions across 
modes due to a too sector-specific approach, (3) the role of the information and communication 
technologies, namely in terms of (sector-specific) innovation, (4) decarbonisation and 
environmental sustainability more generally, (5) social sustainability and the user perspective, 
notably in terms of (sector-specific) passenger rights. In this conclusion, we would like to come 
back to two specific aspects, namely the pervasive role of the information and communication 
technologies on the one hand and the user perspective on the other. 
It is obvious that the role of the information and communication technologies in transport goes 
far beyond sector-specific innovation. Rather, this digitalization of transport thanks to the ICTs 
allows, to a certain extent, for a redefinition of transport altogether. The question, therefore, is no 
longer about creating a level playing field among transport modes so as to favour the emergence 
of a single European transport area, but rather about considering transport – or, better, mobility – 
as a whole. The ICTs indeed allow for a more integrated timetable and ticketing and therefore for 
a single mobility interface vis-à-vis the users, as this is, in part, already the case in some urban 
agglomerations. From there it will only be a step to move towards more integrated pricing, so-
called “mobility pricing”, which, at the same time, will be a small advancement towards a modal 
shift in both cargo and passenger transport. We think that taking up the opportunities that the 
digitalization of transport offers constitutes one of the two major challenges before the incoming 
Juncker Commission in the transport area. 
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The other major challenge is linked to this digitalization of transport but goes one step further 
inasmuch as the users, the European citizens, are put at the centre: rather than simply further 
developing and gradually integrating the different transport modes, one may start to look at 
integrated mobility as a service to the European citizens, comparable to communications and 
energy services. Again, the model may be found at the urban level, where citizens are no longer 
simply considered as users of different transport modes, but as consumers of seamlessly 
integrated mobility services (rail, metro, trams, buses, cars, taxis, bicycles, etc.) without being 
owners of any of the vehicles and without having to worry about parking and maintaining any of 
the vehicles. This seems to us to be a vision that the incoming Juncker Commission (DG MOVE) 
could easily embrace and work towards.  
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Chapter 4: Water 
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The importance of water in our societies is often underrated. It is one of the most precious 
natural resources but it also brings along some of the biggest challenges at the European level. 
Climate change, evolution of population, urbanization, increasing pollution pressures, investment 
needs, affordability, accountability are some of the issues, which put water governance under 
serious pressure. Water is essential for human life, nature and the economy. It is permanently 
renewed but it is also finite and cannot be made or replaced with other resources. Freshwater 
constitutes only about 2% of the water on the planet and competing demands may lead to an 
estimated 40% global water supply shortage by 2030
23
. The overriding importance of the water 
sector for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth can hardly be overstated and explains why 
many different DG units should include water in their agenda. 
1. State of play and achievements 
European water policy is quite young. It basically starts with the approval of the first European 
Water Framework Directive (WFD) in 2000
24
. EU actions before the WFD such as the Drinking 
Water Directive
25
 (1998) and the Urban Waste Water Directive
26
 (1991) can duly be considered 
milestones. However, the EU WFD addressed for the first time in a comprehensive manner all 
the challenges associated with water, making it clear that water management is much more than 
just water distribution and treatment. Its primary aims were to achieve good ecological status of 
waters in Europe by the end of 2015.  
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To reach such an objective, the WFD sets up a model of water management focused on three key 
elements: i/ the river basins as the basic unit of water management; ii/ the introduction of the 
economic model "water pays for water" stipulating that Member States will be required to ensure 
that the price charged to water consumers reflects the true costs; iii/ the promotion of citizen 
participation in water policy with the following Leitmotiv “Getting Europe’s water cleaner. 
Getting the citizens involved”27.  
Concerning this last objective, there are two main reasons for an extension of public 
participation. The first is that the decisions on the most appropriate measures to achieve the 
objectives in the river basin management plan will involve balancing the interests of various 
groups: it is essential that the process is open to the scrutiny of those who will be affected. The 
second reason concerns enforceability. The higher the transparency in the establishment of 
objectives, the imposition of measures and the reporting of standards, the more the Member 
States will take care of implementing the legislation in good faith, and the greater the power of 
the citizens to influence the direction of environmental protection, whether through consultation 
or, if disagreement persists, through the complaints procedures and the courts. Caring for 
Europe's waters will require more involvement of citizens, interested parties, non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs). This is an important issue on which we will come back later on. 
The balance sheet that can be made of the WFD is ambivalent. The objective of good ecological 
status of waters in Europe will not be reached in 2015. Overall, in 2012, more than half (55%) of 
the total number of classified surface water bodies in Europe is reported to have less than good 
ecological status/potential
28
. In addition, objectives concerning the access to safe drinking water 
are still not reached for a part of EU citizens among the poorest citizens. And the situation 
concerning basic sanitation system is very contrasted. The proportion of the population 
connected to urban wastewater treatment has been gradually increasing and is above 80% in 
eleven EU Member States for which data are available, and is exceeding 90% in some countries 
(i.e. highest rates in Malta, the Netherlands, UK, Germany, Spain, and Luxembourg). At the 
other end of the range, less than one in two households are connected to urban wastewater 
treatment in Romania, Serbia, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, and Bosnia and 
Herzegovina
29
. 
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We can thus talk about a Water divide in Europe as well as many people are talking about a 
digital divide. Europe has one of the longest track records in water management in the World and 
is still a global industrial leader in terms of service provision and technology development. This 
history has also led to Europe having a wide spectrum of leading expertise in the various aspects 
of water resource management. Hundreds of European Institutions, public and private water 
service providers, SMEs, engineering and consulting companies have developed and continue to 
develop highly technical concepts to address water problems in the EU and around the globe. 
With the Water Framework Directive and related policies, the EU has one of the most ambitious 
and challenging pieces of water legislation in the world. It provides a unique regulatory driver 
for innovation in the water‐dependent economy, and potentially offers a competitive 
advantages comparing to other regions. Still, there are remaining challenges to be addressed by 
the Juncker Commission.  
2. Some remaining challenges 
The water sector brings together a number of economic, environmental and societal issues. 
Without trying to be exhaustive, we would like to point out some of them that we believe should 
be on top of the agenda of the next Commission. 
Competition and the Provision of Water Services: a Missed Opportunity 
The EU should favour, as much as possible, the efficient use of scarce water resources as well as 
efficient production of water services without hampering investments made in this sector. 
Maintenance of existing infrastructure and investment in new assets remains crucial to secure 
supply, and there are concerns about raising sufficient revenue to support these activities to the 
level required to provide this essential service to future generations. A study from the French 
observatory on water sector performance stated that the average rate of network replacement in 
France lead to a full replacement every 160 years
30
. Knowing that the life duration of water 
network infrastructures is around 50 years, more investments are needed. And France is not an 
exception at the European level. 
One way to increase efficiency is to foster competition and to allow for public private 
cooperation in producing water services. Developing such a road is not without any difficulties. 
Markets and competitions are not emerging naturally, especially for public services that are local 
monopolies. The economic analysis studied such market failures for decades now and the limits 
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of competition are identified as well as their remedies
31
. The Concessions Directive voted in 
early 2014 is a good step towards a more structured competition in the provision of public 
services
32
. However, the exclusion of water from the Concessions Directive is, from our point of 
view, a missed opportunity and it presents one immediate task for the Commission. The 
Commission must indeed produce a report within five years to assess the effects of the water 
exemption identifying the costs and benefits, which may have resulted. The Commission thus 
will have a role in informing the political and economic debate through providing data on the 
current nature of the water services sector. This role will be crucial in a context where citizens 
are more demanding concerning information on water. 
More Transparency in order to Have More Informed Stakeholders  
The last Eurobarometer on Water
33
, based on the interview of 25,524 European citizens, 
concluded that fewer than four out of ten respondents feel well or very well informed (37%) 
about problems facing groundwater, lakes, rivers and coastal waters in their country. Two-thirds 
of respondents believe that more information about the environmental consequences of water use 
is the most effective way of tackling water problems showing that progress still have to be made 
concerning information given to citizens.  
In addition, the Right2Water campaign
34
 submitted a policy proposal to the EC in December 
2013, using the EU Citizen’s Initiative (ECI). More than 1.8 million citizens signed. One of the 
main messages of the campaign, leading to the exclusion of water of the Concessions European 
Directive was that water supply and management of water resources should not be subject to 
internal market rules and should be excluded from liberalization
35
. The EC responded by 
affirming the unique role of water “not a commercial product like any other but, rather, a 
heritage which must be protected, defended and treated as such”. The EC also emphasized the 
importance of developing more transparency and benchmarking, and ensuring equal treatment 
within the context of national and local choice. 
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We believe more transparency as well as more benchmarking should be on the top of the agenda 
of the European Commission. Transparency is clearly an issue. With the exception of few 
countries, it is very hard to obtain basic data concerning water services such as prices, operating 
costs, quality of distributed water, treatments, leakage rates, % of referenced network and so on, 
number of calls for tenders per years when the services are operated through concession 
contracts, and so on. And this information is crucial to understand and inform citizens about how 
efficient their water services are. 
We argue that transparency and benchmarking needs are inseparable. Benchmarking is a way 
for utilities to improve their performances by comparing themselves with other comparable 
utilities. However, this does not mean that benchmarking should be operated by and for utilities 
at their will. In our view, benchmarking is a key element in order to achieve more transparency. 
It is also one regulation tool. Without any benchmarking exercise, transparency does not give 
any valuable information to citizens. For example, observing that prices are on average higher 
when service are privately operated is misleading if privately operated services are specialized in 
specific and difficult-to-operate areas as it is the case in France
36
. Without any economic analysis 
of this information, through benchmarking exercises comparing prices between comparable 
services, more information does not lead to more knowledge for citizens. 
A Better Coordination Between Regulatory Bodies to Achieve a Smarter Regulation of Water 
There is a great variety between water services within Europe concerning the quality and 
abundance of raw water; the degree of fragmentation of water services (In France, there exist 
more than 30,000 water services. In the UK, less than 35); the degree of vertical integration 
between services (in France, water distribution and water sewage are separated services, leading 
to separated contracts when externalized to private operators; in Italy, utilities are providing both 
services), the fragmentation of responsibilities; the existence of a national regulation agencies 
(NRAs) and their powers; diverse organizational arrangement and their frequency (i.e. direct 
public management vs. public private partnerships) and so on.  
We believe the Commission should be committed more explicitly not only to provide data on all 
those dimensions but also to support benchmarking initiatives between water services in Europe 
which will provide information on the relative performance of the water sector in different 
geographical areas. While comparability may be difficult because of varying local conditions, the 
Commission should be encouraged to provide data and to foster benchmarking exercises, which 
will inform the debate and enable future decisions to be taken with more knowledge of the costs 
and benefits of different arrangements. This benchmarking exercise could be easily facilitated if 
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the Commission helps for the creation of a network of water regulators (broadly defined, with 
NRAs when they exist or authorities building regulation when regulators do not exist), in order 
to share data, experiences and foster capacity building in a number of Member States where the 
NRAs are still weak. Such a network would be very valuable and probably less easily captured 
than a single European authority that is sometimes called for.  
It would also bring more transparency because transparency is not just about putting data on line 
but is also about informing citizens through providing benchmark studies, explaining raw data, 
comparing efficiency of water services “all things being equals”.  
More Competition, More Transparency and Smarter Regulation while Preserving the 
Resources 
Europe's freshwater resources are under increasing stress, with a worrying mismatch between 
demand for, and availability of, water resources across both temporal and geographical (spatial) 
scales. Water stress is an issue for arid regions with low rainfall and high population density, but 
also for temperate areas with intense agricultural, tourism and industrial activities. Among the 
EU-28 Member States, Croatia, Finland and Sweden recorded the highest freshwater annual 
resources per inhabitant (around 20,000 m³ or more). By contrast, relatively low levels per 
inhabitant (below 3,000 m³) were recorded in the six most populous Member States (France, 
Italy, the United Kingdom, Spain, Germany and Poland). Poland, the Czech Republic, Cyprus 
and Malta present the lowest values with between 200 and 1,600 m³ per person
37
 (An area is 
experiencing water stress when annual water supplies drop below 1,700 m³ per person (UN 
World Water Development Report 4, 2012)). 
Global climate change is already exacerbating these problems with projections indicating 
significant and widespread impacts over the medium to long term. Growing competition for 
water resources between different water using sectors is already emerging.  
One partial answer is the maximization of water reuse. It is a specific objective of the Blueprint 
to Safeguard Europe's Water Resources (COM/2012/0673) which mentioned the development of 
a possible regulation establishing common standards for water reuse. It is also a top priority area 
in the Strategic Implementation Plan of the European Innovation Partnership (EIP) for Water. As 
a follow-up to the Blueprint, the Commission aims to evaluate the most suitable EU-level 
instrument(s) to foster water reuse, while ensuring the health and environmental safety of water 
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reuse practices and the free trade of food products. In 2015, the Commission intends to finalize 
an assessment on the issue and, subject to its conclusions, to make a proposal as appropriate.  
This is a first step, but probably more should be done in order to preserve the resources and 
secure access to water to the EU citizen. 
___ 
These three priorities are clearly linked altogether. Implementing more competition with smart 
regulation processes can be achieved only if it leads to more transparency in order for regulation 
to be accepted by stakeholders and if it respects constraints such as the preservation of the 
resources and the access to water for everyone. 
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Concluding remarks and future directions for regulatory policies 
and research 
The overall aim of this Manifesto was to critically reflect upon the achievements of the 2
nd
 
Barroso Commission in the various network industries and, building upon these as well as upon 
the needs of the different stakeholders operating in the various sectors, to outline the main 
challenges as well as the priorities for the incoming Juncker Commission. Thanks to the 
collaboration of the four FSR Area Directors and FSR Research Associates, and also thanks to 
the interviews and the inputs collected from the partners and the network of the Florence School 
of Regulation during the past six months, this Manifesto offers a fair account of the 
achievements of the 2
nd
 Barroso Commission and a realistic outlook onto the challenges that 
await the Juncker Commission in the various network industries in terms of regulatory policy.    
The 2
nd
 Barroso Commission had pursued its sectoral approach to network industries and, in 
doing so, made significant progress towards creating a single European energy market, an ever 
more integrated European market for electronic communications and media, and a Single 
European Transport Area. Progress in the water sector, however, had been quite scant. 
At the end of the 2
nd
 Barroso Commission, a 2014-2020 EU budget, which focuses on research, 
innovation and infrastructures as instruments to connect the European Union within and beyond 
its borders in the energy, transport and electronic communications sectors, was adopted. 
The Commission has already started to move towards cross-cutting topics, such as 
decarbonisation, social issues and the promotion of ICTs. Together with the new budget it lays 
the grounds for a new concept of a more integrated infrastructure connecting the continent. From 
the perspective of the Florence School of Regulation, this concept should be on the top of the 
agenda of the Juncker Commission for the coming five years. 
However, all this will probably continue to be done in a sectoral approach, and here is, where we 
think the main challenge of the incoming Juncker Commission lies: technological innovation, 
especially in the area of the ICTs, is increasingly blurring the boundaries of the different network 
industry sectors. While there will continue to be energy services, transportation services, 
communications services and water services, these services will increasingly be provided on the 
basis of a new “data infrastructure”, which is collecting, storing, manipulating and packaging all 
the data shared by users. It is imaginable that this will be the new, cross sectoral infrastructure of 
the future and we urge the Commission to start seeing it as such. Subsequently, this new “data 
infrastructure” will have to be harmonized, integrated and regulated, in the interest of the 
European citizens and according to the principle of non-discriminatory access. 
For the Florence School of Regulation: 
Matthias Finger 
Nadia Bert 
David Kupfer 
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